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Extended Abstract
The growing popularity of Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN) makes the spec-
trum of their applications very wide. A great number of the application areas
like health monitoring or military applications require a high level of security
and dependability from the wireless sensor network. Solving these issues can be
supported by providing cryptographic solutions into WSN applications. Since
the WSNs mainly consist of low power devices, cryptographic solutions ideal for
WSNs should provide computationally lightweight security mechanisms produc-
ing small data packets and ensuring confidentiality. Cryptographic mechanisms
that have both these features are considered in this thesis, which main objective
is the analysis of the applicability of the short key elliptic curve cryptography in
WSN environments. Reduced key lengths require modification of the standard
ECC security algorithms to provide authentication and also a novel solution for
a cryptographic secure pseudo-random number generator. The proposed solution
is based on the standard ECC, but it differs in several aspects. The main dif-
ference is that the parameters of the used elliptic curve have to be kept secret.
This is due to the fact that solving the Discreet Logarithm Problem (DLP) for
such short parameters can be done in short time. Additionally, using shorter
parameters for the underlying elliptic curves excludes also the use of standard
hash functions, what mainly influences the mechanisms for generating the digital
signature. Hash functions require large input values and produce relatively large
output data that is inapplicable in the shortECC environment. Thus, within this
thesis a modified version of standard Elliptic Curves Digital Signature Algorithm
is proposed, which does not require any hash function. The shortECC needs
pseudo-random numbers in the encryption and the digital signature protocols,
but since it operates on numbers that are significantly shorter than the ones used
by other cryptographic approaches, pseudo-random number generators for stan-
dard approaches are not suitable for shortECC. Thus, the new pseudo-random
number generator not involving any additional hardware besides the modules
available on the used test platform and operating on 32-bit long integers, is pro-
posed. The randomness of the numbers generated by the proposed algorithm
v
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and their applicability for cryptographic purposes were evaluated using the NIST
test suites. The shortECC approach was also subjected to cryptanalysis in or-
der to proof its security and determine the circumstances and constraints for its
application.
Kurzfassung
Die große Popularita¨t drahtloser Sensornetzwerke (Englisch: Wireless Sensor Net-
works WSN) ist vor allem auf deren großes Anwendungsspektrum zuru¨ckzufu¨hren.
Viele Anwendungsbereiche wie die Telemedizin zur Patientenu¨berwachung oder
auch Anwendungen fu¨r das Milita¨r haben jedoch sehr hohe Anforderungen an
die Sicherheit und Zuverla¨ssigkeit solcher drahtlosen Netzwerke. Kryptographis-
che Verfahren ko¨nnen helfen diese Anforderungen zu erfu¨llen. Drahtlose Sensor-
netzwerke bestehen allerdings oft aus energielimitierten Gera¨ten. Entsprechend
sind kryptographische Verfahren gefordert, die den Anforderungen an eine hohe
Sicherheit und Zuverla¨ssigkeit bei niedrigem Energieverbrauch genu¨gen, d.h. le-
ichtgewichtige kryptografische Operationen sowie die U¨bertragung kleiner Daten-
mengen. Der Fokus dieser wissenschaftlichen Arbeit liegt auf der Untersuchung
von Ansa¨tzen, die beiden Eigenschaften erfu¨llen. Hauptziel dabei ist die Analyse
der Anwendbarkeit kryptografischer Verfahren in drahtlosen Sensornetzwerken,
die auf elliptischen Kurven mit kurzen Schlu¨sseln basieren (shortECC).Verku¨rzte
Schlu¨ssella¨ngen erfordern dabei Modifikationen der Standardalgorithmen fu¨r Kryp-
tografie mit Elliptischen Kurven (Englisch: Elliptic Curve Cryprography ECC),
um Authentifikation zu gewa¨hrleisten sowie auch eine neue Lo¨sung fu¨r den kryp-
tografischen Pseudozufallszahlengenerator bereitzustellen. Die vorgeschlagene
Lo¨sung (shortECC) basiert auf dem Standard ECC, unterscheidet sich aber in
einigen wesentlichen Aspekten: Der Hauptunterschied liegt in der Geheimhal-
tung verschiedener Parameter, die im Standard ECC in der o¨ffentlichen Doma¨ne
vorkommen. Das ist vor allem dadurch begru¨ndet, dass die Lo¨sung des diskreten
Logarithmusproblems (Englisch: Discreet Logarithm Problem DLP) mit solchen
kurzen Schlu¨sseln fu¨r den Standard ECC sehr einfach wa¨re. Zudem schließt fu¨r
die vorgesehene Schlu¨ssella¨nge von 32-bit beziehungsweise 64-bit die Verwendung
der Standard Hash-Funktionen aus. Hash-Funktionen nehmen große Daten als
Eingang und produzieren Werte, die fu¨r den Einsatz in der shortECC Umge-
bung zu groß sind. Dies beeinflusst hauptsa¨chlich die Algorithmen fu¨r die Gener-
ierung von Digitalen Signaturen. Im Rahmen dieser Arbeit wurde ein Algorith-
mus vorgestellt und evaluiert, der auf dem Standard-Elliptische Kurven Digital
vii
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Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) basiert und keine Hash-Funktion erfordert. Bei
den shortECC Algorithmen werden Zufallszahlen fu¨r die Verschlu¨sselung und
das Generieren einer Digitalen Signatur benutzt. Da aber die Standardansa¨tze
von kryptografischen Zufallszahlgeneratoren fu¨r die kurzen Zahlen nicht immer
geeignet sind, wurde eine neue und sehr effiziente Lo¨sung fu¨r einen sicheren Pseu-
dozufallszahlengenerator vorgestellt und evaluiert. Der vorgeschlagene Generator
verwendet keine zusa¨tzliche Hardwaremodule, kann aber verschiedene Hardware-
module zum Initialisieren nutzen. Die Qualita¨t der generierten Zufallszahlen fu¨r
kryptografische Zwecke wurde mit der NIST Test Suite mit einem sehr positiven
Ergebnis evaluiert. Der vorgeschlagene shortECC-Ansatz wurde auch mit kryp-
toanalytischen Methoden untersucht, um die angebotene Sicherheit aber auch die
Schwachpunkte und Umsta¨nde, in welchen diese entstehen, zu ermitteln.
Chapter 1
Introduction
With the increasing popularity of Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) the spec-
trum of their applications becomes very broad. And taking into account all
the variations referred in the literature as Wireless Sensor and Actor Networks
(WSAN), Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) or Internet of Things (IoT) the possi-
ble applications are limited only by the imagination of the developers. A great
number of the application areas, like health monitoring, homeland security or
prediction of environmental threats require a high level of security and depend-
ability from the sensor network. Thus, since the WSNs are mainly about the
data, the data exchange needs to be performed securely, reliably and without
fails. Solving these issues can be supported by providing cryptographic solutions
into WSN applications.
The WSNs mainly consist of energy constrained and, as a result, low power
devices. This causes that the application development for WSNs is not a triv-
ial task. Such applications need to be very sensitive when it comes to energy
consumed for processing of data, and also for exchanging the data within the
network [47]. Both these aspects are critical and none of them can be neglected.
Hence, cryptographic solutions for WSNs need to be defined or chosen carefully
and that with respect to the computational effort they require, as well as to the
amount of data (or data overhead) they produce.
Cryptographic approaches based on elliptic curves belong to the class of public
key cryptography. One of the reasons behind the popularity of the Elliptic Curve
Cryptography (ECC) is the shorter length of the keys, compared to the public key
cryptography solutions based on modular arithmetic, such as the RSA approach.
According to the NIST, the same security level is provided by elliptic curves
over 224-bit long prime fields and by 2048-bit long factoring modulus used in
cryptography based on the modular arithmetic (RSA) [3].
ECC provides a diversity of solutions for satisfying the security requirements
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of the applications. The following examples are just an excerpt.
 confidentiality - Elliptic Curves Integrated Encryption Scheme or Elliptic
Curve ElGamal Encryption, (both briefly introduced in Chapter 3)
 authentication and non-repudiation - Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Al-
gorithm, (see Chapter 3)
 secure agreement of the secret keys between two (or more) parties - Elliptic
Curve Diffie-Hellman Protocol, (see Chapter 3)
For the cryptography based on elliptic curves it is recommended to use prime
fields with order not smaller than a 224-bit long number [3]. Although applying
such elliptic curves is feasible for WSN, the computations performed on 224-bit
long numbers cause large energy expenditures and take too much time if applied
frequently [47] - this burden can reduce the possible sleep time and as a result
shorten the lifetime of the sensor nodes. Additionally, there are applications,
where the data to be secured is much shorter than the public key cryptography
parameters, if the sensor measurements are stored in 32-bit long variables and
each of them needs to be secured separately. Using the standard public key cryp-
tography with a key-size that is considered to be secure, causes in such cases an
enormous extension of the transmitted packets, and thus increase of the amount
of energy consumed while exchanging the data. The solution ideal for WSNs
should provide computationally lightweight security mechanisms that, on one
hand, produce small data packets and, on the other hand, provide mechanisms
ensuring confidentiality and authentication. ECC based mechanisms that have
both these features are considered in this thesis. In rest of this thesis the ECC
solutions that are using key lengths as recommended by NIST, will be referred
to as the standard ECC, while the solutions with reduced key lengths will be
referred to as the shortECC.
1.1 Objectives and Contributions
The main objective of this thesis is the analysis of the applicability of the short
key elliptic curve cryptography in WSN environments. The analysis included the
following steps.
 Identification of requirements and constraints that are caused by WSN and
are related to the energy consumption and to the computational efficiency.
 Identification of the overall security requirements of WSN influencing fur-
ther selection of cryptographic algorithms.
 Selection of the key lengths sufficient to fulfil the above mentioned require-
ments.
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 Definition of the requirements and constraints of the cryptosystem based
on the short key elliptic curve cryptography - the shortECC cryptosystem.
 Proposal for the necessary modifications in the standard ECC security al-
gorithms.
 Comparison of the shortECC and the state of the art solutions.
 Conclusions indicating possible application scenarios for the shortECC ap-
proach.
Based on the requirements and constraints identified for the proposed short-
ECC cryptosystem, it was stated that it is necessary to modify the standard ECC
security algorithms to provide authentication and also to propose a novel solution
for a cryptographic secure pseudo-random number generator.
Lightweight Security
The proposed shortECC solution is based on the standard ECC, but it differs
in several aspects. The main difference is the change in the distribution of the
parameters between the public and secret domains, i.e. the parameters of the
used elliptic curve have to be kept secret. This is due to the fact that solving
the Discreet Logarithm Problem (DLP) for such short parameters can be done
in short time. As a result, the proposed shortECC approach can be considered
as hybrid solution combining the features of the secret key cryptography and the
public key cryptography.
Additionally, using shorter parameters for the underlying elliptic curves ex-
cludes also the use of standard hash functions, what mainly influences the mech-
anisms for generating the digital signature. Hash functions require large input
values and produce relatively large output data that is inapplicable in the short-
ECC environment. The standard ECC authentication algorithm - Elliptic Curve
Digital Signature Algorithm [21] - requires a cryptographic hash function, (see
Algorithm 9). Thus, within this thesis a modified version of standard Elliptic
Curves Digital Signature Algorithm is proposed, which does not require any hash
function. This signature scheme is described in Chapter 4, Section 4.2.2.
In order to proof the security of the proposed approach and specify the ap-
plication area the cryptanalysis of shortECC was performed. The cryptanalysis
considers following cases that may lead to determining the valid shortECC pa-
rameters:
 brute force attack in case when all the shortECC parameters are unknown
for an adversary,
 probability of finding a proper base point in case all other shortECC pa-
rameters are known,
4 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
 finding the shortECC parameters on the basis of the eavesdropped short-
ECC points in uncompressed form,
 finding the shortECC parameters on the basis of the eavesdropped short-
ECC points in compressed form.
Cryptographic Pseudo-random Number Generator
Pseudo-random numbers are required in many cryptographic protocols for WSN,
e.g. in the key exchange protocols [25]. The need for research on new approach
was caused by the requirements of the shortECC, which needs pseudo-random
numbers in the encryption and the digital signature protocols. Since the short-
ECC operates on numbers that are significantly shorter than the ones used by
other cryptographic approaches, pseudo-random number generators for standard
approaches are not suitable for shortECC. Development of the new approach was
also influenced by the shortECC assumptions to be computationally inexpensive
and minimal energy consuming. Thus, the new pseudo-random number generator
does not involve any additional hardware besides the modules available on the
used test platform and operates on 32-bit long integers. The randomness of the
numbers generated by the proposed algorithm and their applicability for crypto-
graphic purposes were evaluated using the NIST test suites [2] [43]. The details
on the novel cryptographic pseudo-random number generator are presented in
Chapter 5.
1.2 Structure
The rest of this thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 presents the mathemat-
ical background useful to understand the theory of elliptic curves. This chapter
explains also the basic definitions from the theory of cryptography required in
further considerations. Chapter 3 introduces the Wireless Sensor Networks. It
presents the challenges that need to be met while developing WSN applications,
focusing mainly on security requirements. Further in this chapter the state of the
art security algorithms and protocols for WSN are discussed. Chapter 4 presents
the concept of shortECC - the public key elliptic curves cryptography with short
parameters. It starts with the definition of the constraints and requirements of
the environment within which shortECC may be applied. Further, it presents the
security protocols being part of the shortECC cryptosystem. The chapter con-
cludes with the evaluation of the proposed approach and comparison to the state
of the art security solutions for WSN. Chapter 5 introduces the novel crypto-
graphic pseudo-random number generator for low power devices that is based on
mathematical chaos and was developed in order to fulfil the requirement of short-
ECC. This chapter concludes with the evaluation of the proposed approach and
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comparison to the state of the art pseudo-random number generator solutions.
Chapter 6 summarizes the thesis and its main research results.

Chapter 2
Theoretical background
2.1 Finite Field Arithmetic
The finite field arithmetic serves as a basis for many cryptographic protocols.
The operations performed in these fields can be used to compute and express
the particular states of the cryptographic protocols. Since the elliptic curves are
defined over finite fields, the computations on the elliptic curves are performed
using the finite field arithmetic.
The rest of this chapter introduces the basic definitions from the abstract alge-
bra theory leading to the theory of the elliptic curves. The abstract algebra deals
with algebraic structures - sets with defined operations, where the operations are
performed on finite numbers of inputs.
2.1.1 Groups
The basic algebraic structure is a group, serving also as a base for more compli-
cated structures, e.g. finite fields. The additive group is defined as follows:
Definition 1. An additive group (G,⊕) consists of a set G with an addition ⊕
on G as a binary group operation satisfying the following axioms:
 The group operation is associative. That is
a⊕ (b⊕ c) = (a⊕ b)⊕ c, for all a, b, c ∈ G (2.1)
 There is an element O ∈ G, called the identity element, such that
a⊕O = O ⊕ a = a, for all a ∈ G (2.2)
7
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 For each a ∈ G there exists an element −a ∈ G, called the inverse of a,
such that
a⊕−a = −a⊕ a = O. (2.3)
A group G is abelian (or commutative) if, furthermore,
 a⊕ b = b⊕ a, for all a, b ∈ G, [38].
In case of multiplicative groups, denoted G∗, the group operation is multipli-
cation, denoted ⊗, the identity element is I and there exists inverse of a group
element a, such that:
a⊗ a−1 = a−1 ⊗ a = I. (2.4)
The groups used in cryptographic protocols have finite number of elements.
Such groups are called finite groups and the number of elements in a finite group is
its order and is denoted #G. A finite group of order n = #G is denoted Gn. The
concept presented in this work assumes using the groups of prime order. This
assumption causes, that subgroups of G have properties, which are important
when designing the cryptosystem described in this work. A subgroup is defined
as follows:
Definition 2. A non-empty subset H of group G is a subgroup of G if H is itself
a group with respect to the operation of G [38].
The Lagrange’s Theorem presents the properties of the order of the subgroup.
Theorem 1. Let G be a finite group and H be a subgroup of G. Then the order
of H divides the order of G [9].
Thus, if finite group G has a prime order n, then there are no subgroups of
G having order different than n or 1. And thus, every subgroup of group G is
generated by some element of G, i.e.:
Example 1. Let a ∈ G and a 6= O, then the set
{a, a⊕ a, a⊕ a⊕ a, . . . , a⊕ a⊕ · · · ⊕ a︸ ︷︷ ︸
m times
} (2.5)
is a subgroup of G generated by a and is denoted by 〈a〉.
The order of 〈a〉 is equal to the order of the element a and is defined as follows:
Definition 3. The order of a is the smallest positive integer m, such that
a⊕ a⊕ · · · ⊕ a︸ ︷︷ ︸
m times
= O. (2.6)
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Thus, if group G has a prime order n and there are two dividers of n: 1 and
n and since
a︸︷︷︸
1 time
= a 6= O (2.7)
the only possible order of the subgroup 〈a〉 of G is n and the subgroup contains
the following elements:
{O, a, a⊕ a, a⊕ a⊕ a, . . . , a⊕ a⊕ · · · ⊕ a︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−1 times
} (2.8)
The only case when the subgroup of G can have the order equal to 1 is the
case of subgroup 〈O〉, containing only one element. The case when the order of
the subgroup of G is equal to the order of G describes the following definition:
Definition 4. A group G is cyclic if there is a ∈ G such that 〈a〉 = G. If such
an element a exists, it is called a generator of G [9].
In the rest of the work, only finite cyclic additive groups of prime order will
be taken into consideration.
2.1.2 Finite Fields
A field consists of an additive group and of the additional operation. It is defined
as follows:
Definition 5. A field (F,+, ∗) is a set F, with two operations: addition denoted
+ and multiplication denoted ∗ on F, satisfying the following axioms:
 (F,+) is an abelian group with an identity element O.
 The ∗ operation is associative. That is
a ∗ (b ∗ c) = (a ∗ b) ∗ c, for all a, b, c ∈ F. (2.9)
 There is a multiplicative identity denoted I, where I 6= O, such that
I ∗ a = a ∗ I = a, for all a ∈ F. (2.10)
 The multiplication operation is distributive over the addition operation.
That is
a∗(b+c) = (a∗b)+(a∗c), and (b+c)∗a = (b∗a)+(c∗a), for all a, b, c ∈ F.
(2.11)
 For all a, b ∈ F there is a ∗ b = b ∗ a.
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 Each non-zero element a ∈ F has a multiplicative inverse, i.e., an element
b ∈ F such that a ∗ b = I.
The finite field is defined as follows:
Definition 6. A finite field is a field F containing a finite number of elements.
The order of the finite field is the number of its elements.
Definition 7. Let p be a prime number. The set of the integers modulo p:
{0, 1, 2, . . . , p− 1} with addition and multiplication performed modulo p, is called
a finite field of order p. Such field is denoted as Fp.
The finite fields of prime order are called prime fields. In the rest of this work
only finite fields of prime order will be considered.
The multiplicative groups of the prime field are commonly used for the cryp-
tographic purposes. The multiplicative group G∗p of the prime field Fp is defined
as follows:
Definition 8. Let a ∈ Fp, then the multiplicative group G∗p of the field Fp is a
set: {a : 1 ≤ a ≤ p− 1}. The group order is equal to p− 1.
2.2 Elliptic Curves
The elliptic curves over finite fields are used for solving many cryptographic prob-
lems, e.g., for decomposition of integers into a product of prime numbers or for
primality testing. They are also used to build cryptosystems. The attractiveness
of the elliptic curves is driven by the multiplicity of the finite groups (groups of
points on the elliptic curves), that can be defined over prime fields and also due
to the secure key lengths, which are shorter than in case of cryptosystems defined
over multiplicative group of the finite field [3].
2.2.1 Elliptic Curves over Finite Prime Fields
The important issue when developing cryptosystems based on the elliptic curves
is the selection of the field, which will be used as a basis for the elliptic curve.
The two types of fields are considered: binary and prime finite fields and in this
work only the elliptic curves over prime fields are taken into account. The elliptic
curve over prime field is defined as follows:
Definition 9. An elliptic curve E over a field Fp, denoted as E(Fp), is the graph
of an equation of the form
E(Fp) : Y 2 = X3 + aX + b (2.12)
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where the coefficients a, b ∈ Fp are such, that for each point (X,Y ) with coordi-
nates in Fp the equation (2.12) is satisfied. The elliptic curve E is nonsingular,
when −16(4a3 + 27b2) 6= 0, [57].
In the following, both E(Fp) and E notations will be used to denote the
elliptic curves defined over prime fields.
Group Law
Let E(Fp) be an elliptic curve. For points P = (x1, y1), S = (x2, y2) ∈ E, where
P 6= ±S, there is P + S = (x3, y3) where
x3 =
(
y2 − y1
x2 − x1
)2
− x1 − x2 and y3 =
(
y2 − y1
x2 − x1
)
(x1 − x3)− y1. (2.13)
For point P = (x1, y1) ∈ E, where P 6= −P , there is 2P = (x2, y2) such that
x2 =
(
3x21 + a
2y1
)2
− 2x1 and y2 =
(
3x21 + a
2y1
)
(x1 − x2)− y1 (2.14)
The points on the elliptic curve E(Fp) form an additive abelian group with
following properties:
 Commutative property: for all points P = (x1, y1), S = (x2, y2) ∈ E, there
is P + S = S + P .
 Identity element: for all points P ∈ E, there is P +O = P .
 Inversion element: for a given point P ∈ E, there exists −P ∈ E, such that
P + (−P ) = O. The point −P is called the inversion (negative) of P. If
P = (x, y), then −P = (x,−y).
 Associativity: for all points P, S, T ∈ E there is (P +S)+T = P +(S+T ).
Elliptic curve point multiplication
Let P ∈ E and k ∈ Fp, then
kP = P + P + · · ·+ P︸ ︷︷ ︸
k times
for k > 0 and 0P = O. (2.15)
The kP operation is called scalar multiplication of the point P .
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The group order
The points on the elliptic curve E(Fp) form an additive group, where the number
of points on this curve is called the order of the elliptic curve and is denoted
#E(Fp). The bounds for #E can be determined using the Hasse’s theorem [21]:
Theorem 2. (Hasse) Let E be an elliptic curve defined over Fp. Then
p+ 1− 2√p ≤ #E ≤ p+ 1 + 2√p. (2.16)
The interval [p+ 1− 2√p, p+ 1 + 2√p] is called the Hasse interval.
The point representation - projective and affine coordinates
Each point P represented by affine coordinates (x, y) lying on the elliptic curve
E(Fp) can be also represented using projective coordinates (X,Y, Z). For Z 6= 0
the affine coordinates of a point are obtained as follows:
(x, y) = (X/Z, Y/Z). (2.17)
For projective coordinates the equation 2.12 can be formulated as follows:
E(Fp) : Y 2Z = X3 + aXZ2 + bZ3. (2.18)
The inverse of P = (X,Y, Z) is point −P = (X,−Y,Z). Points with Z = 0
are all points at infinity and are denoted O.
The projective representation of the points on an elliptic curve is useful for
performing addition and doubling operations of the points. Using the projective
coordinates these operations require only multiplications in Fp, without the need
for computing inversions in Fp - more computationally expensive operations. The
only point where inversions are computed is in case when it is necessary to repre-
sent the results in affine coordinates. The elimination of the inversion causes the
increase of the multiplications in Fp, thus the purposefulness of using the projec-
tive coordinates depends elementarily on the ratio of the number of inverses to
the number of the multiplications in Fp.
Jacobian projective coordinates
Using the Jacobian projective coordinates, the point P = (X,Y, Z) ∈ E cor-
responds to the affine point (X/Z2, Y/Z3) for Z 6= 0. And if Z = 0, then it
corresponds to the point at infinity O. In Jacobian projective coordinates the
point doubling is faster and the point addition is slower than for the projective
coordinates [9]. The elliptic curve equation is given by:
E(Fp) : Y 2 = X3 + aXZ4 + bZ6. (2.19)
The Jacobian projective representation of points on the elliptic curve will be
applied in the rest of the work.
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Point operations - Jacobian projective coordinates
According to the results presented in [21] the Jacobian projective coordinates
yield the fastest point doubling and mixed Jacobian - affine coordinates yield the
fastest point addition. The following algorithms present the operations of point
doubling and addition for points represented in Jacobian projective coordinates.
Algorithm 1 Point doubling, Jacobian projective coordinates [4]
Input: P = (X1, Y1, Z1) ∈ E(Fp).
Output: 2P = (X2, Y2, Z2) ∈ E(Fp).
if P = O then
return O.
end if
T1 ← 3X21 + aZ41 .
Z2 ← 2Y1Z1.
T2 ← 4X1Y 21 .
X2 ← T 21 − 2T2.
T3 ← 8Y 41 .
Y2 ← T1(T2 −X2)− T3.
return (X2, Y2, Z2).
Point compression
For storage and transmission of the points on the elliptic curve it is of advantage
if the amount of data can be reduced. In case of resource constrained devices
it is important to represent these data using as few bits as possible. A point
represented in affine coordinates (x, y) requires 2n bits to be stored, where n =
dlog2 pe. This number of bits can be reduced to n + 1, since for a determined
x-coordinate the elliptic curve equation is a quadratic equation with an unknown
y. Thus, there is only one bit needed to keep the information about the least
significant bit of y-coordinate, what is enough to know which from two solutions
of the quadratic equation is correct. Thus, the compressed form of the point
P = (x, y) includes its x-coordinate and the least significant bit f the y-coordinate.
And in order to decompress the point, it is necessary to solve the quadratic
equation.
First, by using the Legendre Symbol
(
x
p
)
, it has to be checked if the quadratic
equation has a solution. For the prime field Fp the Legendre Symbol is defined
as follows:
(
x
p
)
=

+1 if t2 ≡ x (mod p) has a solution t 6≡ 0 (mod p)
−1 if t2 ≡ x (mod p) has no solution t
0 if x ≡ 0 (mod p)
(2.20)
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Algorithm 2 Point addition, Jacobian projective coordinates [4]
Input: P = (X1, Y1, Z1), Q = (X2, Y2, Z2) ∈ E(Fp), such that P 6= ±Q.
Output: P +Q = (X3, Y3, Z3) ∈ E(Fp).
if P = O and Q = O then
return O.
end if
if P = O then
return Q.
end if
if Q = O then
return P .
end if
T1 ← X1Z22 .
T2 ← X2Z21 .
T3 ← T1 − T2.
T4 ← Y1Z32 .
T5 ← Y2Z31 .
T6 ← T4 − T5.
T7 ← T1 + T2.
T8 ← T4 + T5.
Z3 ← Z1Z2T3.
X3 ← T 26 − T7T 23 .
T9 ← T7T 23 − 2X3.
Y3 ← (T9T6 − T8T 33 )/2.
return (X3, Y3, Z3).
Solving the quadratic equation can be performed by using the Tonelli-Shanks
algorithm [8].
2.3 Cryptography
A term cryptography relates to the techniques ensuring security of information
while it is being sent or stored. Security of information can be achieved by
providing mechanisms for:
 Data confidentiality - the information can be accessed only by entitled en-
tities.
 Data integrity - the information cannot be manipulated while it is being
sent.
 Authentication - the sender/owner of the information can be identified.
 Data availability - the information can be accessed when it is needed.
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 Non-repudiation - the entity cannot deny sending the information.
2.3.1 Cryptographic Primitives
Plaintext
A plaintext is an information in its original, by any cryptographic technique
unchanged form.
Ciphertext
A ciphertext is a text, which was obtained by encoding plaintext using some
cryptographic technique.
Encryption
An encryption is an operation that encodes plaintext into ciphertext.
Decryption
A decryption operation allows to obtain the plaintext from the ciphertext.
Digital Signature
A digital signature is a set of cryptographic techniques preventing the data from
being modified or tampered. It provides authentication of the data sender, data
integrity and non-repudiation.
Cryptographic Keys
A cryptographic key is an information that serves as a parameter in cryptographic
operations (e.g. encryption, digital signature). All the keys available for some
cryptographic operation build a set known as the key space and denoted K. There
is an important fact concerning the size of the key space [9]:
A necessary, but usually not sufficient condition for an encryption scheme to be
secure is that the key space has to be large enough to preclude the exhaustive
search.
Definition 10. Let K be the key space for a set of encryption transformations.
A sequence of symbols e1e2e3 . . . ei ∈ K, is called a keystream [9].
Cryptographic Nonce
Cryptographic nonce is a number that can be used only once during the cryp-
tographic operation. Using the nonce more than once could cause threats in
security protocols.
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Initialization Vector
Initialization Vector (IV) is a number of fixed length. Some cryptographic pro-
tocols require that the number is random or pseudo-random other ones require
only non-repetitiveness. It is used as an input value in ciphering algorithms and
helps to avoid the situation when the same plaintext after encryption results in
the same ciphertext.
Cryptographic Hash Functions
A hash function is the function subordinating a number of arbitrary size to a
short one, having determined length. The hash functions used for cryptographic
purposes need to fulfil the following requirements:
 Collision resistance - it should be practically impossible to generate the
same hash value for two different inputs.
 Pre-image resistance - for the hash values h it should be practically impos-
sible to find message m such that hash(m) = h.
 One-wayness - it should be impossible to compute an input message on the
basis of hash value.
Message Authentication Code
Message Authentication Code (MAC) is in cryptography a one-way function pro-
viding a code that ensures the integrity and authenticity of the message. A
keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC) is an example of MAC in-
cluding the secret key in each operation and using cryptographic hash function
as secure one-way function. The proper HMAC can be computed only by the
entity knowing the secret key. Adding the secret key ensures the authenticity of
data, which can be verified only by other entity knowing the secret key.
Cipher-based Message Authentication Code
Cipher-based Message Authentication Code (CMAC) is an algorithm based on
block cipher (e.g. AES) providing the authenticity and integrity of data
2.3.2 Symmetric Key Cryptography
In the symmetric key cryptography a single and the same key is used for both
encryption of a plaintext and decryption of the ciphertext. The key is kept secret
by all entities taking part in the information exchange. There are two types of
ciphers used in symmetric key cryptography: stream and block ciphers. The
stream cipher is a symmetric algorithm which ciphers each bit of the plaintext
2.3. CRYPTOGRAPHY 17
separately by combining it with the respective bit of the keystream (symmetric
key). The bits of the plaintext and the bits of the keystream are inputs of the
exclusive disjunction (XOR) operation returning 1 if only one of the inputs is
equal to 1. The result of the XOR operation is the ciphertext. Decryption
is done by performing the XOR operation for the ciphertext and keystream.
Another type of cipher - the block cipher - performs the encryption operation
on blocks, which are obtained by dividing the plaintext into strings of equal and
usually predefined length. During the encryption, the input (plaintext) block is
ciphered into an output (ciphertext) block using the encryption transformation
and the key, where both the input and output have equal length. Without the
corresponding deciphering transformation and the key this process is irreversible.
Block Ciphers - Modes of Operation
The following confidentiality modes can be used with underlying block cipher
[14].
 Electronic Codebook.
One of the simplest ciphering modes. In this mode of operation the same
plaintext blocks result in identical ciphertext blocks. The blocks are en-
crypted and decrypted independently.
 Cipher Block Chaining (CBC).
This mode uses an Initialization Vector, which is XORed with the first
plaintext block and after that encrypted, what results in ciphertext block.
The next plaintext blocks are XORed with the previously computed cipher-
text blocks and encrypted. On the basis of CBC a cipher block chaining
message authentication code (CBC-MAC) is proposed. It creates message
authentication code from block cipher.
 Counter Mode (CTR).
The CTR mode features the application of the forward cipher to a set of
input blocks, called counters, to produce a sequence of output blocks that
are exclusive-ORed with the plaintext to produce the ciphertext, and vice
versa.
Confusion and Diffusion
The terms confusion and diffusion were introduced by Shannon [53]. He suggested
that provision of the confusion and diffusion in ciphering algorithms will help to
obscure the statistical properties of the plaintext and thus prevent from statistical
analysis attacks on ciphertext. The diffusion is responsible for rearranging the
bits in the plaintext in order to omit the redundancies in the ciphertext. The
role of confusion is to make the relationship between key and the plaintext as
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complicated as possible. To achieve these both properties the block cipher uses
a substitution-permutation network, which relates to the set of mathematical
operations performed on the blocks of the plaintext and the key. The substitution-
permutation network consists of substitution-boxes (S-box) and permutation-
boxes (P-box). The S-box is a kind of black box with input, output and unknown
content. The essence of its operation is to transform some number of input bits
into output bits, where the number of output bits does not have to be equal to
the number of input bits. The P-Box is used to permute and transpose bits in
S-Box.
2.3.3 Asymmetric Key Cryptography
The asymmetric cryptography uses sets of two or more mathematically connected
keys, where one of the keys is publicly known and this fact does not influence
the security level provided by the cryptosystem using this key. The asymmetric
cryptography is used for encryption and for digital signatures using two keys-
private key and public key. It should be computationally infeasible to compute
the private key on the basis of the public key. In the encryption schemes the
public key is used for the encryption of the information and the private key is
used for its decryption. The private key is known only to the recipient of the
encrypted information and only she is able to decrypt it. The public key is
known to anyone who wants to encrypt the information.
In digital signature schemes the authenticating party generates first the hash
of the information. The hash is generated by the function, which subordinates
a short message with defined size to the input information. This short message
is encrypted by the authenticating party with its private key and enclosed as
a digital signature to the original message. Anyone possessing the public key is
able to verify the digital signature by deciphering the hash with the corresponding
public key and comparing it to the hash the sender has generated from the original
message.
The algorithms used in asymmetric cryptography are based on functions
which are easy to compute but hard to invert [9]. The following paragraphs
name examples of functions used for cryptographic purposes:
Discrete Logarithm Problem
The difficulty of finding the discrete logarithm, i.e. solving the Discrete Loga-
rithm Problem (DLP), is a basis of the security in many cryptographic algorithms,
like key agreement protocols or encryption mechanisms. The discrete logarithm
of element b to the base a, where a and b are elements of the finite cyclic multi-
plicative group G of order n is the unique integer c ∈ (0, n− 1) such that:
ac = b. (2.21)
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The DLP is defined as follows:
Definition 11. Let G∗p of order p − 1 be the multiplicative group of the prime
field Fp and a be the generator of this group. The issue of finding the integer x,
where 0 6= x 6= p− 1, such that for the element b ∈ G∗p there is:
ax ≡ b (mod p), (2.22)
is called Discrete Logarithm Problem.
Elliptic Curves Discrete Logarithm Problem
The security of the cryptographic techniques based on Elliptic Curves is also
based on the DLP.
Definition 12. Let E be the elliptic curve over the finite field Fp and let P and
Q ∈ E(Fp) be the points on the elliptic curve. Let n = #E(Fp) be the order of
the group of points on E and m ∈ {0, ..., n− 1} be a positive integer such that:
Q = mP. (2.23)
Having m and P it is easy to compute Q, but it is assumed to be hard to compute
m on the basis of known Q and P . The issue of finding m is called the Elliptic
Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP).
Integer Factorization Problem
The security of many cryptographic protocols (e.g. RSA [50]) is based on the
fact that the efficient method for factorization of large composite integers is not
known.
Definition 13. The integer factorization problem is the following: given a posi-
tive integer n, find its prime factorization, that is, write: n = pe11 p
e2
2 · · · pekk where
the pi are pairwise distinct primes and each ei ≥ 1
2.3.4 Key Exchange
A key exchange is a cryptographic technique for exchanging the cryptographic
keys between two entities willing to use other cryptographic methods, e.g. en-
cryption algorithm. The key exchange problem is in sending the keys only to
trusted parties and preventing unauthorized entities from obtaining the keys.

Chapter 3
State of the art
3.1 Wireless Sensor Networks
A wireless sensor network (WSN) is a network consisting of small and low cost
devices with constrained computational and energy resources called sensor nodes.
These sensor nodes cooperate in order to fulfil the tasks defined for the WSN.
The wireless sensor networks are applied in diverse environments and for diverse
purposes. The WSN can be used to monitor some phenomena and to deliver
the sensor data to the appropriate place, e.g. sink. This cooperation is possi-
ble due to the wireless communication between nodes, which are equipped with
radio transceivers and sensing or acting means. Such WSNs can be used to sup-
port the early detection of earthquakes, landslides or floods by performing the
measurements of the identified phenomena and delivering the sensed data to the
control centres. They also improve people’s quality of life. Health monitoring
supported by wearable and implantable sensor nodes enables the patients to re-
cover at home. Wireless sensor networks integrated within houses allow better
control of the consumption of energy. This increases the house owners’ awareness
and helps them to influence the natural resources to be consumed.
3.1.1 WSN - Challenges
There are several very specific features and requirements characterizing the wire-
less sensor networks which make the creation of WSNs a very challenging task.
 Hardware limitations
The wireless sensor networks are often composed of very large number of
tiny devices and deployed in places, where their presence cannot be con-
stantly monitored. The devices can be broken, wasted or even stolen, thus
the costs of the exchange or replenishment of the sensor nodes should be
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acceptable for the network owner. Using the wireless sensor networks for
supporting daily life should not cause huge expenses for people deciding to
use it, otherwise it could be hard to introduce new technologies and ideas.
As mentioned above, once deployed, sensor nodes should work without the
interference of its maintainer as long as possible. Since the sensor nodes are
battery powered it is a crucial issue to ensure that the selection of hardware
components for the sensor boards and also the development of the software
running on this hardware is done carefully and with respect to the energy
resources available on the nodes.
 Network architecture
Sensor networks can be dense and also dynamic. Due to the wireless nature
of the communication some WSN applications, e.g., military ones, require
that the sensor networks self-organize themselves after deployment and that
the network is able to self-maintain. Self-maintenance allows adjustments in
the working of the hardware and software components, in order to achieve
the goals. There are important aspects that need to be constantly mon-
itored and assured in the network, e.g., that the clocks on the nodes are
synchronized in some defined periods of time. If it is also necessary for the
application, each node has to know its (relative) location and the nodes
being currently in its one-hop neighbourhood. Another important issue
that needs to be considered when developing the WSN is the ability of self-
healing, i.e., recognition of network malfunctions and appropriate reactions,
in order to restore the right state of the network. There are WSN appli-
cations, e.g., environmental monitoring that require the mobility of sensor
nodes. Mobile sensor nodes can enhance the capabilities of the statically de-
ployed WSN by improvement of the sensing area coverage or by provision
of communication redundancy to improve connectivity. This causes that
the data paths linking the sensor nodes and the sink are not static and the
network needs solutions for creating dynamic routing paths. Adding new
nodes to the existing network implies that the network needs to support
scalability. Scalability in turns causes that the protocols for WSN need to
adapt themselves to changing number of nodes. The WSN protocols should
be responsive to changes in their environment, e.g. those influencing the
connectivity. Nowadays it is desired to design the wireless sensor networks
that are interoperable, i.e. that the nodes belonging to one network will be
able to cooperate with nodes from other networks, creating heterogeneous
networks.
 Dependability
Many wireless sensor network applications (especially the industrial ones)
are very demanding in terms of the system dependability. They require that
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the network will work reliable, i.e., properly and continuously for some in-
tended period of time. In order to ensure the reliable work, the network
needs to be able to cope with faults, like radio interferences, battery ex-
haustions or de-synchronization. Another issue is the service availability
- requiring that the service provided by the wireless sensor network is not
affected by the faults of any of its components (e.g. single sensor nodes
or clusters of nodes) and will be operational when needed. In case when
a failure appears, it is very important that the system will be restored or
retained to the given condition within a defined period of time. The mea-
sure of the system restoring rapidity and the system restoring ease is known
as its maintainability. Another important issue influencing the overall sys-
tem dependability, is that it shall be impossible for unauthorized entities
to have an access to the information that the system is using, i.e., the con-
fidentiality of the information has to be ensured. The information used by
the system must not be manipulated by any means, i.e., its integrity has
to be preserved. These two requirements - confidentiality and integrity -
together with availability are the most important information security goals
and will be described in the following subsection.
3.1.2 WSN - Security Requirements
Most of the WSN applications operate in hostile environments and are exposed
to thefts or intentional alterations of data. Also the hardware is threatened with
damages, tampering or theft. Thus, provision of means solving the security issues
in such resource constrained and highly distributed environment, as the wireless
sensor networks are, is an important and challenging issue. There are following
security issues related to WSN world:
 Data Confidentiality.
Confidentiality ensures that any data communicated within the wireless
sensor network is accessed and processed only by authorized entities - sensor
nodes, cluster heads, sink or network maintainer. It is important, that the
data to be sent or stored is encrypted.
 Data Availability.
The data availability means that the data which is processed or stored is
obtainable and ready for use on demand by the authorized users. It is
thus important to ensure the communication between devices and also that
the devices containing the data or being on the transmission path will be
present and active when needed.
 Data Integrity.
This requirement refers to the assurance that the data will have the form
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intended by the issuer during its transmission, processing and storage. It
has to be ensured, that the data transmitted from the source to the recipient
will not be altered on the way.
 Authentication.
It has to be ensured that the communicating node is the one it claims to
be and the node receiving the data packet will be able to verify the sender.
 Non-repudiation.
Non-repudiation ensures that the sender of a data cannot later deny that
she is sender of this data, and the recipient of the data cannot deny that
she has received this data.
 Data Freshness.
This requirement refers to the assurance that the data which is sent is the
most recent one, i.e., it should not be possible for an adversary to send
outdated messages.
 Authorization and Access Control.
It is required to determine the resources an entity is allowed to access and
the operations the entity can perform on these resources. This is done by
access control mechanisms on the basis of policies defining what resources
can be used/accessed by the particular entities. Granting the entitlement
to access and use the resources is called authorization.
 Forward secrecy.
It must not be possible that a node which does not belong to the network
any more is able to read the messages sent within the network.
 Backward secrecy.
It must not be possible that a new node in the network is able to get access
to the previously sent messages.
3.1.3 Attacks on Wireless Sensor Networks
Due to the fact that the nodes of a WSN may be deployed in unprotected areas it
is possible that the network will be attacked. The type of the attack is dependent
on the capabilities of the adversary, on her location and on her access level. If the
attacker can compromise only sensor nodes she is called a mote-class attacker.
Such an attacker is able to attack low-energy sensor nodes, but is not capable to
perform strong attacks. Another type of the attacker is a laptop-class attacker
using devices with stronger computational and energy resources than the sensor
nodes are equipped with. Further, the adversary can be located inside or outside
the network and can perform passive or active attacks. The following types of
attacks can be distinguished in the WSN world:
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 Man in the Middle attack.
An adversary pretends to be a network member and controls the commu-
nication between the nodes. She is able to steal or even to manipulate the
data. An example of such an attack is the exchange of the authorized public
key used for encryption of data by one provided by the adversary. After
that the adversary is able to decrypt the exchanged data.
 Node replication attack.
An adversary can get access to the security parameters, like secret keys for
example, by physically capturing a node being part of the network. After
that she can prepare a malicious node having the captured security creden-
tials and node ID, insert it into the network and induce other nodes from
the network to accept the malicious node as the legitimate member of the
network. The malicious node is equipped with the ID of some node being
part of the network. The replicated node can drop, reroute or change the
packets it gets. The malicious node can also generate false and misleading
data packets.
 Spoofing, altering, replying the routing information.
The target of this attack is the routing information exchanged by the nodes.
By spoofing, altering or replaying this information the attacker can create
new routing paths, change the lengths of the existing ones or generate false
error messages.
 Wormhole attack.
In this attack the malicious nodes are placed in different parts of the net-
work. The node from one part of the network receives the messages over
an alternative low latency link and sends them to the different part of the
network. This causes the routing disruption (false routes), the routing race
conditions, changes in the network topology and changes in the normal
message flow.
 Eavesdropping, gathering, stealing the data.
In this attack the malicious node accesses the content of the communica-
tion by listening to the message transmissions in the broadcasting wireless
medium. This attack violates the data confidentiality and privacy.
 Collisions.
In this attack the data is transmitted continuously by an adversary to cause
collisions in the network, to trigger retransmissions. Collisions can also be
caused by sending altered data, which due to the incorrect MAC cannot
be received by the recipient. The altered packets are sent again what also
causes collisions.
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 Exhaustion of the resources of the sensor nodes.
The power resources of the sensor nodes are exhausted by forcing the nodes
to waste energy on pointless operations, like the continuous retransmissions.
 De-synchronization.
In this attack the transmission between two nodes is resynchronized. This
can be done by continuous sending of fake messages containing outdated
sequence numbers or flags. This causes that the nodes need to synchronize
by retransmitting the missed frames what depletes their resources leading
to the exhaustion.
 Jamming.
The jamming attack is the deliberate transmission of radio signals in order
to disrupt the information. Jamming attack causes temporary or permanent
suspension in reception and transmission of the packets by the jammed
sensor node.
 Physical attack.
In this attack the adversary performs the attacks on the devices. By tam-
pering the sensor nodes it is possible to extract the security parameters
(secret keys), or the information about the network (from the source code
for example). The adversary can change the source code in order to get
access to the network or replace the nodes.
 Selective forwarding/Black Hole Attack.
It this type of attack the malicious nodes do not forward or even drop the
messages. This causes data loss and may even disrupt the whole network.
The case when the malicious node refuses to forward any message it gets
is called a black hole attack. In this attack the neighbouring nodes have to
choose an alternate path for transmitting the data.
 Sybil attack.
In this type of attack a malicious node can present multiple identities to the
other nodes in the network. This attack influences the redundancy mech-
anisms of distributed storage or multipath routing and data aggregation
mechanisms.
 Sink-hole attack.
In this type of attack, the adversary lures the traffic from the nearest area of
the compromised node. In this case the adversary can manipulate the data
packets, can modify the routing information, can fabricate and drop the
messages. This attack can trigger other attacks, like selective forwarding.
 Hello flood attack.
Some of the routing protocols for WSN require sending hello messages by
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the nodes in order to discover their neighbouring nodes. In this type of
attack the laptop-class attacker broadcasts a hello message to the neigh-
bouring nodes assuring them that she is their neighbour and wants to start
a communication with them. Since the attacker uses a high-power wireless
link, she can reach every node in the network.
 Acknowledgement spoofing.
Some of the routing protocols for wireless sensor networks require sending
the acknowledgements. The adversary spoofs the link layer acknowledge-
ments in order to inform the communicating nodes that some weak link is
strong and assures reliable communication or that some disabled node is
active.
3.2 Security Solutions for Wireless Sensor Networks
3.2.1 Symmetric Key Cryptography
This section presents the most important symmetric key cryptography solutions
used in WSN.
RC4
The popular stream cipher RC4 was designed by Rivest in 1987. The encryption
and decryption operations are performed by using a keystream. This keystream is
generated using a pseudo-random number generator for which the seed is obtained
in the key setup algorithm. As presented by Rivest in [49] there are known attacks
on the RC4, thus in 2014 the author proposed the improved variant of RC4, called
Spritz. The method is still new and requires deep cryptanalysis.
Data Encryption Standard
The Data Encryption Standard (DES)is a symmetric block cipher and was used
as an encryption standard in USA until 2001. Due to the short key length, i.e.
56 bits, it is not recommended currently for most of the applications. In 1999
the DES key was broken and it took 22 hours and 15 minutes using 1856 chips
which were coordinated by one PC.
Advanced Encryption Standard
The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) is a symmetric block cipher accepted
as an encryption standard [42] by American federal agency - National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST). The cipher is based on the Rijndael cipher [12]
proposed by Joan Daemen and Vincent Rijmen. Originally the Rijndael cipher
supports several block and key lengths, which can be independently chosen as
28 CHAPTER 3. STATE OF THE ART
128-, 192- or 256-bit ones. For the AES standard the NIST allowed using only
128-bit long blocks and choosing from three key lengths, i.e. 128, 192 and 256
bits. The algorithm performs 10 (for 128-bit long key), 12 (for 192-bit long key)
or 14 (for 256-bit long key) ciphering rounds. Each round consists of operations
performed within substitution-boxes and permutation-boxes.
Skipjack
The Skipjack algorithm was invented by American National Security Agency
(NSA) in 1998 [44]. It is a Feistel cipher (Feistel network) structure and uses 80-
bit long symmetric key and 64-bit long blocks and performs 32 ciphering rounds.
The Feistel network allows for encryption and decryption using the same function,
which do not have to be one-way function.
3.2.2 Key Management Schemes
There are three types of key management schemes applicable to wireless sensor
networks.
First one is the Trusted Server Scheme depending on the trusted party (base
station) used for key agreement. This scheme uses symmetric cryptography for
data encryption and the base station is responsible for establishing the key agree-
ment between two communicating entities. Each sensor node needs to store only
one secret key, but it has to communicate with the base station each time it
wants to establish communication with another node. Another type of the key
management scheme is the Self Enforcing Scheme using public key cryptography,
e.g. public key certificates, for key management. The scheme is computationally
expensive, because the public key cryptography requires rather complex compu-
tations.
The third type of key management scheme is Key Pre-distribution where the
key information is distributed among sensor nodes prior to deployment.
Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol
The Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol [13] was designed by Witfield Diffie
and Martin Hellman in 1976. Its strength is based on the difficulty of comput-
ing the discrete logarithm problem in finite fields. The key agreed using this
algorithm can be used for encryption of the communication data. It allows for
secure key agreement using public communication channels even though there is
an entity eavesdropping on this operation, but in turn it does not prevent from
man in the middle attacks. The protocol is not constrained to be used by two
parties only-the key can be agreed by an arbitrary number of entities. The basic
version of the algorithm is presented by Algorithm 3.
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Algorithm 3 Diffie-Helmann key agreement [38]
Summary: A and B each send the other one message over an open channel.
Result: shared secret K known to both parties A and B.
1. One-time setup. An appropriate prime p and generator α of G∗n, where
2 ≤ α ≤ n− q are selected and published.
2. Protocol messages.
A sends to B: αx (mod n) (1)
B sends to A: αy (mod n) (2)
3. Protocol actions. Perform the following actions each time the shared key is
required.
(a) A chooses a random secret x, such that 1 ≤ x ≤ n−1, and sends B message
(1).
(b) B chooses a random secret y, such that 1 ≤ y ≤ n−1, and sends A message
(2).
(c) B receives αx and computes the shared key as K = (αx)y (mod n).
(d) A receives αy and computes the shared key as K = (αy)x (mod n).
Elliptic Curves Diffie-Hellman protocol
In 1985 Miller [39] and Koblitz [25] suggested independently to use Elliptic Curves
in cryptography. Miller proposed an analogue of the Diffie-Helmann protocol over
group of points on the elliptic curve stating that it is 20% faster than the protocol
based on the G∗n. The secret key can be derived form the point K, taking for
Algorithm 4 Elliptic Curves Diffie-Helmann shared secret agreement
Summary: A and B each send the other one message over an open channel.
Result: shared secret K known to both parties A and B.
1. One-time setup. A and B agree on elliptic curve E(Fp) and choose point
P ∈ E(Fp) such that, the subgroup generated by P has large order.
2. Protocol messages.
A sends to B: aP (1)
B sends to A: bP (2)
3. Protocol actions. Perform the following actions each time the shared secret
is required.
(a) A chooses a random secret a ∈ (0,#E(Fp)), and sends B message (1).
(b) B chooses a random secret b ∈ (0,#E(Fp)), and sends A message (2).
(c) B receives a and computes the shared secret as K = baP .
(d) A receives b and computes the shared secret as K = abP .
example some defined number of bits from the x-coordinate of this point. The
security of this approach is based on the hardness of the Elliptic Curves Discrete
Logarithm Problem (ECDLP). The ECDLP is presented by Algorithm 4.
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3.2.3 Asymmetric Key Cryptography
This section presents the most important asymmetric cryptographic approaches.
RSA
RSA [50] is one of the first and most commonly used asymmetric key cryptogra-
phy approaches. It was designed in 1977 by Rivest, Shamir and Adleman. The
algorithm can be used for both encryption and generating digital signatures. In
[50] the idea behind the RSA algorithm is explained as follows:
A message is encrypted by representing it as a number M , raising M to a pub-
licly specified power e, and then taking the remainder when the result is divided
by the publicly specified product, n, of two large secret prime numbers p and q.
Decryption is similar; only a different, secret, power d is used, where
e · d ≡ 1 mod (p− 1) · (q − 1). (3.1)
The security of the system rests in part on the difficulty of factoring the published
divisor, n.
ElGamal
The ElGamal algorithm [16], next to RSA, is one of the most popular public
key cryptography methods used for both encryption and digital signatures. Its
security is based on the difficulty of solving the discrete logarithm over the finite
field of prime order. It was proposed by Taher ElGamal in 1985 and it implements
the Diffie-Hellman key exchange algorithm to encrypt and decrypt messages. In
order to encrypt a message the public private key pair is required. The procedure
of generation of key pair is presented by Algorithm 5.
Algorithm 5 Key generation for ElGamal encryption [38]
Summary: Each entity A creates a public key and a corresponding private key.
Each entity A should do the following:
1. Generate a large random prime n and a generator α of the multiplicative
group G∗n of the integers modulo n.
2. Select a random integer a, such that 1 ≤ a ≤ n−2, and compute αa (mod n)
3. A’s public key is (n, α, αa); A’s private key is a.
The encryption and decryption procedures are presented by Algorithm 6.
Elliptic Curves ElGamal
In 1985 Koblitz proposed an analog of the ElGamal system [25]. The decision was
justified by the results of the research on the Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm
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Algorithm 6 ElGamal public key encryption and decryption[38]
Summary: B encrypts a message m for A, which A decrypts
1. Encryption. B should do the following:
(a) Obtain A’s authentic public key (n, α, αa).
(b) Represent the message as an integer m in the range 0, 1, 2, ..., n− 1.
(c) Select a random integer k, such that 1 ≤ k ≤ n− 2.
(d) Compute γ = αk (mod n) and δ = m · (αa)k (mod n).
(e) Send the ciphertext c = (γ, δ) to A.
2. Decryption. To recover plaintext m from c, A should do the following:
(a) Use the private key a to compute γn−1−a (mod n) (note: γn−1−a = γ−a =
α−ak).
(b) Recover m by computing (γ−a)δ (mod n)
Problem showing that there is no efficient method for solving it. The methods
for key generation and for encryption and decryption are presented by Algorithm
7 and 8 respectively.
Algorithm 7 Key generation for Elliptic Curves ElGamal encryption
Summary: Each entity agrees on elliptic curve E(Fp) and chosen point P ∈
E(Fp) such that, the subgroup generated by P has large order.
Each entity A should do the following:
1. Select a random integer a and compute aP
2. A’s public key is point aP ; A’s private key is a.
Algorithm 8 Elliptic Curves ElGamal public key encryption and decryption
Summary: There is an agreed elliptic curve E(Fp) and a point P ∈ E(Fp) such
that, the subgroup generated by P has large order.
B encrypts a message m for A, which A decrypts
1. Encryption. B should do the following:
(a) Obtain A’s authentic public key aP .
(b) Represent the message as point M on the elliptic curve E.
(c) Select a random integer k.
(d) Compute M1 = kP and M2 = M + kaP .
(e) Send the ciphertext M1,M2 to A.
2. Decryption. To recover plaintext M from M1 and M2, A should do the
following:
(a) Use the private key a to compute aM1.
(b) Recover M by computing M2 − aM1
Elliptic Curves Integrated Encryption Scheme
This approach is a hybrid encryption method based on the elliptic curves cryp-
tography and on symmetric encryption algorithm [34]. The method requires the
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following functions in order to encrypt/decrypt messages:
 key agreement protocol
 key derivation function
 message authentication code
 symmetric encryption scheme
 hash function
 elliptic curves ElGamal encryption and decryption scheme
 method for random numbers generation.
3.2.4 Data authentication schemes
Most of the applications in wireless sensor networks require assurance that the
data sent within the network originates from the correct sender. For this purpose
the mechanisms for data authentication are used. These mechanisms comprise
both symmetric key cryptographic approaches and public key cryptography ones.
But, the first ones allow for authentication of messages sent between two parties
sharing the secret key. The second ones allow for authenticated broadcast, i.e.
the authenticity of data can be verified by all the parties knowing the public key
of the party which authenticated the data before sending. There are following
approaches that can be used for authentication purposes.
Digital signatures with appendix
In this type of digital signatures the original message that needs to be signed
is required in the verification phase and the hash functions are used in order to
produce the signature. One of the most popular ECC algorithms used for digital
signatures with appendix is the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm [21].
It requires a cryptographic secure hash function and its security is based on
the ECDLP. The methods for signature generation and for its verification are
presented by Algorithm 9 and 10 respectively.
Digital signatures with message recovery
In digital signatures with message recovery the verification phase does not require
the original message, which in turns is recovered from the signature. Such type of
digital signature is proposed in [56]. The concept adopts the idea of self-certified
public keys [20] which do not require that the certificates used for authentication
are separate values. In this case the certificates are parts of the public key. The
user owns a public key which is derived from the signature of its private key
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Algorithm 9 ECDSA signature generation [21]
Summary: Elliptic curve E(Fp) of order n and point P ∈ E(Fp), hash function
h, message m and signer’s private key d.
Result: Signature (r, s).
1. Select k ∈ [1, n− 1].
2. Compute kP = (x1, y1).
3. Compute r = x1 (mod n). If r = 0 then go to step 1.
4. Compute e = h(m).
5. Compute s = k−1(e+ d ∗ r) (mod n). If s = 0 then go to step 1.
6. Return (r, s).
Algorithm 10 ECDSA signature verification [21]
Summary: Elliptic curve E(Fp) of order n and point P ∈ E(Fp), hash function
h, message m, signer’s public key Q and signature (r, s).
Result: Acceptance or rejection of the signature.
1. Verify that r and s ∈ [1, n−1]. If any verification fails then return REJECT
SIGNATURE.
2. Compute e = h(m).
3. Compute w = s−1 (mod n).
4. Compute u1 = ew (mod n) and u2 = rw (mod n).
5. Compute X = u1P + u2Q.
6. If X = O then return REJECT SIGNATURE.
7. If x-coordinate of X is equal to r then return ACCEPT SIGNATURE; else
return REJECT SIGNATURE.
with his identity and is signed by the trusted authority using the private key
of the authority. The secret key of the user is chosen by the user and is secret
for the trusted authority. The digital signature with message recovery based
on self-certified public keys is divided into three phases: initialization, signature
generation and message recovery. In the initialization phase the trusted authority
chooses two large primes p and q and publishes N = p∗q additionally is selects an
integer g and an one-way function h() which are also public. The user Ui with the
identity IDi willing to join the system chooses its private key xi and computes
pi = g
xi (mod N) and sends its identity and pi to the trusted authority. The
authority computes yi = (pi − IDi)h(IDi)−1 (mod N) and publishes its as public
key of the Ui. In order to sign the message M user Ui chooses a random integer
k and computes:
r = M ∗ g−k (mod N) (3.2)
s = k − xi ∗ h(r) (3.3)
and sends the signature (r, s) to the recipient. The verification of the signature
is performed as follows:
M = r ∗ gs ∗ (yh(IDi)i + IDi)h(r) (mod N). (3.4)
34 CHAPTER 3. STATE OF THE ART
Another approach proposing the identity based digital signature with message
recovery is presented in [59]. Its security is based on the discrete logarithm
problem. The scheme assumes existence of the trusted Private Key Generator
(PKG) which public key takes part in the signature verification phase.
Digital signature not using hash function and resistant to forgery attacks is
proposed in [7]. There are following elements needed in order to sign and verify
the message M : large prime p being the order of the finite field Fp, base element
g ∈ Fp, private key xi of the signer Ui and the corresponding public key yi = gxi
(mod p). In the signing procedure the user Ui perform following computations:
s = yMi (mod p). (3.5)
Then Ui chooses random integer k ∈ Fp and computes
r = M ∗ s ∗ g−k (mod p). (3.6)
After that user Ui computes t, where
s+ t ≡ x−1i ∗ (k − r) (mod p)− 1 (3.7)
The signature is the triple (s, r, t). In the verification phase the verifier computes:
M ′ ≡ y(s+t)i ∗r∗gr∗s−1 ≡ gxi(s+t)∗M∗s∗g−k∗gr∗s−1 ≡ g(k−r)∗M∗g(−k+r) (mod p)
(3.8)
If it is true that
s = yM
′
i (3.9)
then the signature is valid and indeed generated by the user Ui.
Authenticated encryption
Authenticated encryption is based on block ciphers but provides simultaneously
data confidentiality and integrity and data authenticity by combining encryption
schemes and message authentication codes. The most commonly used scheme is
the one called Counter with CBC-MAC mode (CCM) [15]. It is based on symmet-
ric key block cipher, with block size of 128-bits, such as AES algorithm. It uses a
single key and combines counter mode encryption and cipher block chaining-based
authentication. The CCM mode consists of two processes: generation-encryption
and decryption-verification. In generation-encryption phase, CBC is applied to
the payload, the associated data, and the nonce to generate a MAC. After that,
the counter mode based encryption is applied to the MAC and the payload to
transform them into the ciphertext. In this mode the length of the payload is
extended by the size of the computed MAC. In decryption-verification phase,
counter mode based decryption is applied to the ciphertext to decrypt the MAC
and the corresponding payload. Then, cipher block chaining is applied to the
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payload, the received associated data, and the received nonce to verify the cor-
rectness of the MAC. Successful verification assures that the payload and the
associated data are provided by the issuer having the proper secret key. Another
approach for authenticated encryption based on AES is the Galois/Counter Mode
(AES-GCM) of operation [37]. GCM uses counter mode of operation and builds
on it by adding a MAC based on hash function. It uses polynomial hashing in
the binary finite field.
3.2.5 Security Protocols for WSN
LSec
In [52] the authors propose LSec - a lightweight security protocol for wireless sen-
sor networks. It is a combination of the trusted server and self enforcing key
management schemes. LSec supports both mobile and static environments with
one or multiple Base Stations. There are two main assumptions in this system.
First, the Base Station is the trusted party and it cannot be compromised. Sec-
ond, the public keys of all nodes in the network are known only to the Base
Station.
In this system a Key Management Module is used for storing public and secret
keys of the nodes in a database. A Token Generator Module generates tokens
for the requesters. The tokens are used by other communicating parties in order
to authenticate the requesters. The Authorization Module is used for checking
if some node is allowed to communicate with other nodes in the group. There
is an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) detecting anomalies in the network. The
IDS can be notified by the mobile agents installed on cluster heads about alarm
situations.
LSec has three phases, authentication and authorization phase, key distribu-
tion phase and data transmission phase. There are seven types of packets used in
this system: Request, Response, Init, Acknowledgement (ACK), Data, Update
Group Key and Alert. Authentication and authorization are performed while
exchanging the Request and Response messages using symmetric cryptography.
In the key distribution phase the exchange of Init and ACK packets using the
asymmetric scheme is done.
When some node A wants to communicate with node B, it has to get a token
and the pubic key of node B from the Base Station first. The Base Station checks
if node A is authorized and can communicate with node B. If yes, the Base Station
generates the token encrypted with the secret key shared between node B and
Base Station. Node A adds the token to the Init packet which is sent to node
B. Node B is able to authenticate node A according to the received token. If the
token is correct, node B generates the session private key, encrypts it and sends
it to A. This key is used to encrypt the data packets exchanged between A and
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B and it is deleted after transmission.
The cluster heads are responsible for updating the secret key for group com-
munication periodically. LSec uses 6 keys taking 72 bytes of memory storage and
introduces about 74 bytes of transmission and reception cost while exchanging
the packets during authentication, authorization and key exchange.
TinySec
TinySec [24] is a lightweight and efficient security architecture for wireless sensor
networks. It provides authenticity, integrity, and confidentiality of messages and
also allows for in-network processing.
This scheme supports two security options: authenticated encryption (TinySec-
AE) and authentication only (TinySec-Auth). In case of authenticated encryption
the data payload is encrypted and authenticated using Message Authentication
Code (MAC). The MAC is computed for encrypted data and the packet header.
In authentication without encryption the packet is authenticated with a MAC,
but the payload is not encrypted.
For encryption the Skipjack algorithm in Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode
is used and to achieve the semantic security a special format of initialization
vector (IV) is used. TinySec is implemented in nesC-the programming language of
TinyOS and requires 728 bytes of RAM and 7146 bytes of program space. Sending
the packets using TinySec-AE causes 10% increase of energy consumption when
compared to sending a regular TinyOS packet. In case of packets using TinySec-
Auth there is 3% increase of energy consumption in comparison to the regular
ones.
SPINS
A set of security protocols for sensor networks is presented in [46]. It consists of
two building blocks: SNEP and µTESLA. TinyOS is used as operating system.
In this security approach each node shares its master secret key with the Base
Station and all other keys are derived from this master key.
SNEP provides data confidentiality, semantic security, two-party data authen-
tication, integrity and freshness. It has low communication overhead adding only
8 bytes per message. To provide semantic security without sending additional
data, two counters are shared by the parties and used for the block cipher in the
counter mode (CTR). The MAC is used for two-party authentication and data
integrity. Independent keys are derived for encryption and MAC.
Two communicating nodes share the master key and they derive independent
keys using the pseudo-random function F . There are different keys for each
direction of communication.
SNEP offers semantic security, i.e., incrementation of the counter causes that
the same message is encrypted differently each time. Data authentication, replay
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protection, weak freshness and low communication overhead are achieved with
MAC.
The µTESLA provides authentication for data broadcast. It is based on
TESLA [45] which is not applicable to the sensor networks, since it uses computa-
tionally expensive digital signature algorithm. Since the authenticated broadcast
requires an asymmetric mechanism, which is too expensive for sensor networks,
µTESLA introduces asymmetry trough a delayed disclosure of symmetric keys.
This scheme requires a time synchronization between nodes and the Base Station.
Each sender generates the chain of secret keys, where every key is associated with
an appropriate time interval. Key A is used to compute the Message Authenti-
cation Code of packet in time interval A and is revealed when the defined time
expires. The recipient stores all the received packets and waits for disclosure of
keys to check the authenticity of the packets. The receivers need to know the key
disclosure schedule to eliminate forged packets. They have to be sure, that the
received packets were authenticated with not revealed keys.
LEAP+
LEAP+ [60] is a key management protocol for sensor networks supporting in-
network processing. Four types of keys are provided in this scheme: an individual
key shared with the Base Station, a pairwise key shared by two nodes, a cluster
key shared by neighbouring nodes and a global key shared by all the nodes in
the network. One way key chains are used to provide a weak local broadcast
authentication.
The Base Station is assumed to be a laptop class device, supplied with long-
lasting power and it cannot be compromised. Every sensor node has to be able
to store hundreds of bytes of keying material. The sensor nodes are not mobile.
The individual keys are preloaded into nodes prior to their deployment. These
keys are generated using the pseudo-random function and a master key, which
are known to the system controller.
The pairwise keys are most commonly used. There are two schemes for es-
tablishing these keys. A basic scheme assumes that the set of neighbours of a
node is static and that the newly added node will discover its neighbours at the
time of its deployment. Each node has a initial key loaded by the controller and
derives a master key from it. A new node sends a HELLO message containing
its ID to its neighbours and receives ACKs authenticated with the master keys
of the neighbours. It also starts a timer to trigger initial and master key erasure.
Having the initial key, the new node is able to derive the master key of its neigh-
bours. Both nodes can now compute their pairwise key without exchanging any
message. When the timer expires the new node erases the initial and the master
keys and uses only pairwise keys. If a compromised node will be detected, all its
neighbours will delete the keys shared with this node. The second scheme is an
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extension of the basic scheme. The controller generates a chain of random initial
keys, which are mapped to the different time intervals. A node deployed in time
interval A receives the initial key for this interval and derives its master key for
the current time interval. It also receives all the master keys for the future time
intervals, but does not receive any initial key corresponding to those time inter-
vals. In the key establishment phase the interval IDs are added to the HELLO
message and the ACKs are authenticated using current master key according to
the interval ID. The establishment of the cluster key is following the phase of the
pairwise keys establishment. The node that wants to establish the cluster key,
generates first a random key and sends it, encrypted with the pairwise keys, to
each of its neighbours. The neighbours store the random key in a table and send
their own cluster keys, encrypted with pairwise keys, to the new node. When
new node is revoked, the neighbours generate new cluster keys.
The global key is preloaded to the nodes, but in case when a compromised
node is detected, the global key is changed and securely distributed to remaining
nodes. First the node revocation operation must be performed. The controller
sends an authenticated broadcast message using µTESLA protocol with the in-
formation about the compromised node. The neighbours of this node delete the
pairwise keys and generate new cluster keys. The distribution of the new global
key assumes that a secure routing protocol is used in the network.
LEAP++
The improved variant of LEAP+ called LEAP++ is presented in [32]. A one-
time master keys and shorter time intervals are used, what improves the node
compromise resilience. In this scheme all the nodes are programmed to start
the neighbour discovery at some time after deployment. One-time master key
is used for each incremental deployment and an one-way key chain is generated
from it. Each one-way key is used for a short period of time. For pairwise key
establishment a node sends a HELLO messages in each time interval. These
messages are verified by the neighbours and when the verifications are correct
the responses are sent. The response is authenticated with a MAC, which is
further verified. The authentication keys are disclosed after some time and the
nodes can be verified by the neighbours. The authors propose also using short
key ECDH to exchange public keys in the encrypted form under LEAP++. The
master keys can be derived from two shared keys of LEAP++ and ECDH. The
ECC-128 or ECC-96 can be used as lightweight cryptosystems.
A key-management scheme for distributed sensor networks
Another key management scheme for distributed sensor networks is presented
in [17]. The key distribution has three phases: key pre-distribution, shared-key
discovery and path-key establishment. In the first phase a large pool P of keys
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is generated together with key identifiers. Then for each sensor a key ring of k
keys from P is derived and loaded into the memory of the sensor nodes. Key
identifiers of the key ring and the identifier of the sensor node are stored on a
trusted controller node.
To ensure that any two nodes share at least one key with a probability of
0.5, there have to be 75 keys drawn from the set of 10000 keys to be on any
key ring. The shared-key discovery phase is done during the initialization of the
whole network, where each node discovers its neighbours. Two nodes can check if
they share keys by broadcasting the identifiers of the keys they posses in the key
ring. This phase builds the topology of the sensor array. If two nodes share a key,
there is a link between them and all communication on that link is secured by
link encryption. The third phase assigns a path-key to nodes that do not share
a key but are connected by links.
When a node is compromised, the revocation message is broadcast by the
controller node. This message contains the key identifiers of the key ring of
the compromised node. The list is signed by the controller and the signature is
unicast to each node in encrypted form. After verification of the signature, the
nodes delete the keys shared with compromised node. Some links can disappear.
Thus, the shared-key discovery and path-key phases are restarted to reconfigure
links in the network.
In [6] a modification of the above described key management protocol is pro-
posed. Instead of finding the shared key by the two neighbouring nodes in their
key rings, the nodes need to find q common keys. This increases the resilience
against node capture. These keys are then used to compute a link key by hashing
all the common keys.
Message Specific Puzzle
An approach mitigating DoS attacks against both µTESLA-based and signature-
based broadcast authentication is presented in [41]. The idea is to use a weak
authenticator of the node, which is efficiently verifiable. Only if the weak authen-
ticator can be verified, the node performs the expensive signature verification or
packet forwarding. The mechanism for weak verification is called message spe-
cific puzzle. This mechanism is independent from the broadcast authentication
scheme and can be seen as an additional layer of protection.
To provide a weak authentication a one-way key chain is used. The chain is
generated as follows: first a random value is selected as the last key in the chain.
The last but one key is generated by performing the hash function for the last
key. The next key is always generated by hashing the previous key. The first
key in the chain is called the commitment of the chain. Before the packets are
broadcast in the network, the sender sends the commitment of the key chain to
all the nodes in the network.
40 CHAPTER 3. STATE OF THE ART
The authors assume, that the commitment is reliably distributed to all re-
ceivers and that, the sender is more powerful than regular sensor nodes. The
receivers must keep the most recently authenticated weak authenticator and its
index. The receiver is able to check if the received packet has already been pre-
viously authenticated by another receiver (replay detection) and if it is the case,
this packet is discarded.
On the basis of this approach the message specific puzzle is developed. The
idea is to use cryptographic puzzle to reduce the chances of an eavesdropper to use
the observed weak authenticator for forging the broadcast packets. The broadcast
message, its index and broadcast authenticator and the weak authenticator are
considered as the puzzle. The attacker cannot pre-compute the puzzle as long
as the key is undisclosed. For each puzzle a solution is computed. The solution
has to fulfil two conditions. It has to be computed for the current key from the
one-way key chain and after applying the hash function to the puzzle and its
solution we get an image where the first l bits are all zeros. The l parameter
is called the strength of the puzzle. The sender broadcast the message together
with its puzzle. The receiver has to verify the key and if it is valid, the puzzle
solution is verified.
The using of the one-way hash function causes that an attacker has to look in
a whole solution space in order to find a weak authenticator. The attacker needs
(on average) to check 2l hash function operations to find a puzzle solution and
using one-way key chains prevents an attacker from pre-computing the puzzle
solutions.
The message specific puzzle brings light computational overhead on sensor
nodes. To verify the weak authenticator only a few hash function operations are
needed. The sender of the message has to pre-compute the one-way key chain
before the deployment. The puzzles require up to l + 6 bits space in the packet
for l ≤ 128.
Short-lived RSA/Rabin broadcast authentication
A broadcast authentication using short-lived RSA/Rabin signatures for sensor
networks is proposed in [31]. The proposed scheme is usable in case if only the
authentication is important in the network. It is sufficient that the signatures are
unforgeable for some defined period of time and that the new instance of chosen
RSA parameters is provided to the network.
The RSA-512 can be chosen, since it requires less energy for the computations
and it is proved that factoring of the RSA-512 moduli takes more than few hours.
The main difficulty lies in the periodical distribution of the new parameters for
the signatures. The author proposes using a kind of DoS-resistant, long interval
µTESLA [46] timed one-way key chains for the distribution. The one-way and
hash functions and MAC are built on the basis of a single block cipher AES-128.
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The hash function is built using the Matyas-Meyer-Oseas construction. For mes-
sage authentication Cipher Clock Chaining Message Authentication Code (CBC-
MAC) or Cipher-based MAC (CMAC) can be used. For broadcast authentication
the probabilistic Rabin signature scheme with message recovery is used.
The length of the RSA moduli should be between 512 and 768 bits. For
energy efficiency a special modulus can be used, which contains information about
security parameters or ID. This information is represented as high-order bits
of the modulus and is embedded during the generation of the modulus. It is
shown that it is highly unlikely that the number field sieve can factor this special
modulus faster than a regular RSA one. To defend from DoS attacks the weak
authentication [41] is used.
The lifetime of the sensor network is divided into equal intervals T-intervals
and from these intervals a sequence of longer time intervals is built, the are
called R-intervals. Each R-interval is divided into two parts: commit interval
and reveal interval. A fresh RSA modulus is assigned to each R-interval and to
each T-interval a key from the one-way key chain is assigned. The RSA modulus
from interval i+1 is committed in commit interval i and revealed in reveal interval
i + 1. The fresh RSA modulus is distributed using a TESLA-like protocol. It
consists of three phases: KDM-precom, KDM-commit and KDM-reveal. During
the KDM-precom phase a MAC for message m and the key K are computed.
For the MAC the weak authenticator w is computed. In KDM-commit phase the
MAC and w are broadcast and in the KDM-reveal phase the message m and the
key K are disclosed. The packets sent consist of the message, its type and the
sender’s ID. The type of the message allows the receivers to properly process the
message and the sender’s ID is used to support multiple senders.
3.3 Random Number Generators for WSN
Random or pseudo-random numbers are required by many security protocols.
An inproper source of randomness can cause that these protocols are insecure or
prone to attacks. In [18] Francillon et al. propose tinyRNG - a cryptographic
pseudo - random number generator for wireless sensor networks. The generator
uses transmission bit errors as a main source of entropy. The authors prove that
the bit errors are randomly distributed, uncorrelated and difficult to manipulate.
The algorithm contains the entropy accumulator part and the ciphering part.
The entropy accumulator is built from CBC-MAC function and when its output
has sufficient entropy it is used as the input - seed for Cryptographic Pseudo
- Random Number Generator, which is a block cipher in counter mode. The
outputs of the block cipher are used as the pseudo-random numbers.
The algorithm requires that the initial key - seed for the block cipher is
preloaded at the programming time and stored in the internal memory. There
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are as many seeds as many nodes are in the network. After the node has booted
the initial seed is used to compute a new seed, which is then saved in memory.
The tinyRNG requires the communication between nodes in order to produce the
pseudo-random numbers.
The random number generator presented by Lo Re et al. in [33] uses the
sensing properties of the wireless sensor network. The main assumption here
is that every sensor node in the network is able to perform sensing in order
to generate random numbers and these are generated using the ADC converter.
The measurements are then buffered and encrypted using CMAC algorithm. The
result of the encryption is XOR-ed with a register block what results in random
number.
To avoid possible manipulation attacks, the sensing task is performed by a
randomly chosen node being the neighbour of the node requesting the random
number. Thus, this approach requires additionally that nodes cooperate and
communicate to obtain the random numbers.
In [19] Gaglio et al. propose the True Random Number Generator using non-
deterministic sensor measurements (temperature, humidity and light exposure
sensors). The sensor measurements are used as seeds of the algorithm improving
the statistical properties of the generated random sequences by adding the diffu-
sion and confusion and by de-skewing. For this purpose MAC based algorithms
are used, i.e. either HMAC or CMAC. The TRNG requires a node acting as a
Base Station which is responsible for processing the data from sensors and pro-
ducing the random number sequences. The approach requires the communication
between nodes and the Base Station in order to produce random numbers.
Another pseudo-random number generator for low power wireless sensor net-
works is proposed by Seetharam et al. in [51]. The generator is based on timer
available on the sensor platform and its values are XOR-ed with the key. The
initial value of the key is the ID of the node and the key is changed by the ones’
complement of the timer value. Additionally it is updated with the 8-bit CRC
values of the transmitted and received packets. The timer value is changed by
ones’ complement of the generated random number.
Another approach for low power devices is proposed by Wang et al. in [58]. It
utilizes the single electron phenomena and its architecture consists of two parts:
single electron circuit and post-processing circuit. The outputs produced by
the generator do not present a random behaviour, thus the additional methods
for bits skipping or bit counting are used in order to prevent from correlation
and to improve the statistical properties. But even after performing these logic
operations on the bit stream, the new output failed the tests for randomness
recommended by NIST [43]
Chapter 4
shortECC Cryptosystem
This chapter presents the results of the analysis of the cryptographic applicability
of elliptic curves over prime fields of small orders that are considered to be too
insecure to be used for the cryptographic purposes. It presents the concept and
the overall idea of the proposed shortECC approach together with the definition
of set-ups in which such lightweight elliptic curves cryptography could be applied.
The chapter concludes with the theoretical analysis of the security of shortECC
and also with the comparative evaluation of shortECC and other state of the
art security approaches for low power devices. The following section describes
the main assumptions and features of the proposed approach and points out the
differences between the standard ECC and shortECC.
shortECC - Notation
The following notation is used in order to introduce the shortECC approach:
 Fp - a finite prime field of order p
 E(Fp) - an elliptic curve over field Fp given by the equation:
Y 2 = X3 + aX + b (4.1)
where parameters a, b ∈ Fp.
 (x, y), where x, y ∈ Fp - a point on the elliptic curve E
 O ∈ E(Fp) - a point at infinity
 P = (xP , yP ) - a base point on the elliptic curve E
 #E = n - order of the elliptic curve
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 n, where nP = O - order of the point P
 A key pair (k,Q), where the private key k ∈ [0, p] and the public key is
Q = kP
 < P > - cyclic group of points generated by P
4.1 shortECC Overview
The idea behind the shortECC cryptography is to use elliptic curves which are
defined over finite fields of prime order, where the bit length of the order is
between 32 and 64 bits. Such cryptography is foreseen for low power devices
and can be applied in WSN only if several requirements are fulfilled and several
constraints are followed. They concern both the environment in which shortECC
is used and the mathematical properties of the sub-components used to build
the cryptosystem. These requirements and constraints are described in following
sub-sections.
4.1.1 Public/private domain for the security parameters
Due to the usually insecure key lengths used in shortECC, the cryptosystem is
usable only for closed groups of nodes. The standard cryptography based on
elliptic curves assumes that only the private key is kept secret and the remaining
parameters, i.e.: Fp, a, b, P, n,Q are publicly known. The main assumption of the
shortECC approach is that Fp, a, b, P, n,Q are known only within the trusted and
closed group of nodes. Each trusted node has also a key pair consisting of the
public and the secret key. The public keys are known only to the trusted group
members. The above mentioned parameters will be referred as the shortECC
parameters (in contrast to the standard ECC parameters) in the rest of this
thesis. This thesis assumes the existence of mechanisms for authentication of the
trusted group members. The changes applied to the parameter set - some public
parameters become private - causes shortECC to become a Public/Private Key
Cryptography hybrid, but also causes the method to be very efficient, because it
enables using much shorter key lengths as in case of standard ECC. The efficiency
advantages include reduction of the computational effort, but also reduction of
the data block size, and thus reduction of energy needed for the transmitting
of the results. The comparison of the shortECC and other standard approaches
in terms of computational effort and ciphertext size is presented further in this
chapter.
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4.1.2 Access authority in trusted group
One of the nodes within the trusted group, e.g., a base station, having usually
more energy and computational resources than the rest of the nodes, performs
the role of the access authority. This node manages the group memberships and
is a kind of gateway between the trusted group and the rest of the world. A
node that wants to join the trusted group has to be considered trustworthy by
the access authority. In order to prove that, it has to have a ticket that grants
the access to the group. The ticket has to be issued and signed by some third
party, which is assumed to be trustworthy by the access authority. Issuing the
tickets and the role of the third party are out of scope in this thesis and these
functionalities are assumed to exist. The access authority is responsible for secure
distribution of the shortECC parameters among the sensor nodes in the group
and for the authentication of the group members, if necessary.
4.1.3 Changing the shortECC parameters
Changing the shortECC parameters periodically in order to enhance the trusted
group security and thus making the brute force attack harder. However, is not
necessary in case when there is no suspicion of any kind of attack in the group.
Results of experiments, as presented in section 4.3, show that the time needed to
reveal the shortECC parameters, when applying the exhaustive search method
is counted in billions of years. The shortECC parameters should be changed
whenever it is detected that a group member was compromised. The generation
of the shortECC parameters is not deterministic - it requires choosing a new set
of parameters, i.e., prime field or elliptic curve equation parameters, until they
fulfil the shortECC requirements. Thus, the method can be computationally
too expensive for the low power devices and the generation procedure should be
performed by one more powerful node, e.g. the one being also the access authority
in the closed group and being able to distribute the new shortECC parameters
securely, e.g. using the parameters’ management tool.
4.1.4 Distribution of shortECC parameters in the trusted group
It is assumed that all the nodes in the trusted group are equipped with the
standard ECC parameters and each node has its own public/private key pair. The
standard ECC is used only in special cases that are described further in this thesis
and uses the same algorithms and operations as the shortECC cryptosystem.
The closed group of nodes willing to use the shortECC cryptosystem requires a
parameters’ management tool responsible for secure distribution of the shortECC
parameters. There are the following cases that need to be considered by that tool:
 The group is not affected by any anomalous situation or behaviour inside
the group and also from outside of the group - in this case the parame-
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ters’ management tool uses currently used shortECC in order to securely
distribute and exchange the new shortECC parameters between the sensor
nodes in the group.
 An anomaly has been detected - In this case the parameters’ management
tool uses the standard ECC for the secure distribution of new shortECC
parameters.
 The currently used shortECC parameters are provided to the new and au-
thenticated group members using the standard ECC.
4.1.5 Application area
The shortECC is especially usable to secure short data payloads, i.e. those with
a bit length not exceeding the shortECC parameters bit lengths. Such cases
include most of the sensor measurements, which are often short data payloads
and usually require less than 32 bits. An attempt of securing data with length
greater than the shortECC parameters, requires splitting the data in blocks of
that size, what provides multiple shortECC compliant packets, each requiring
separate shortECC encryption operations.
4.1.6 Capabilities of an adversary
Within the framework of this thesis it is assumed that the only type of adversary
being interested in data secured with shortECC cryptosystem is a combination of
mote-class attacker and a laptop-class attacker. Such attacker can either compro-
mise low-power sensor nodes or perform attacks (brute force) using devices with
stronger computational and energy resources than the sensor nodes are equipped
with.
4.1.7 Point compression
A very important feature of shortECC is that the points are always sent in the
compressed form (see Section 2.2.1). This approach known from the standard
ECC gets an additional security meaning in case of the shortECC cryptosystem.
Instead of sending both coordinates, only the x-coordinate is sent together with
the information about the sign of the y-coordinate. Only the group members
knowing the shortECC parameters are able to determine the second coordinate.
Compression reduces the amount of data to be transmitted i.e. it reduces the
length of the ciphertext and additionally improves the security (Section 4.3.3).
Since shortECC parameters are available only to the group members, an eaves-
dropper can only try to guess the y-coordinate, e.g., by applying a brute force
attack or performing the attack described in Section 4.3.4. Finding the proper
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shortECC parameters on the basis of an eavesdropped coordinate of some un-
known point is by far more complicated than doing the same knowing both coor-
dinates. Sending only the x-coordinate causes that the total amount of data to
be sent is 66-bit in case of an encryption and 98-bit in case of a digital signature
for input data of 32-bit length, what reduces the transmission energy costs.
4.1.8 Selecting the prime fields
The shortECC requires selecting the prime fields fulfilling the following condition:
Let Fp be a prime field, such that:
p ≡ 3 (mod 4) (4.2)
In this case the method for finding the square root modulo p for a given X, i.e.
solving the elliptic curve equation:
Y 2 = X3 + aX + b (4.3)
reduces to computing (X3 + aX + b)(p+1)/4 [25] and is less complicated, com-
pared to the Tonelli-Shanks algorithm [8] involving randomly choosing elements
fulfilling some defined conditions and using the power operation several times.
4.1.9 Non-singular elliptic curves
For the elliptic curves E(Fp) represented by the equation
Y 2 = X3 + aX + b (4.4)
it should be assured that the discriminant 4a3 + 27b2 of the elliptic curve fulfils
the following condition:
4a3 + 27b2 6= 0. (4.5)
4.1.10 Non-anomalous elliptic curves
The elliptic curve E(Fp) is anomalous if
#E(Fp) = p. (4.6)
For this type of elliptic curves the ECDLP can be efficiently solved [21] and thus
they are not recommended to be used for cryptographic purposes.
4.1.11 Elliptic curves of prime order
Only elliptic curves with a prime number of points can be used in shortECC. It
improves the overall security of the shortECC based cryptosystem, preventing
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from Pohlig-Helmann attack and causing the brute force attack to be more com-
plicated, (see Section 4.3). For these curves all the points on the curve constitute
a single cyclic group. Thus, any point in this group is a generator of all the other
points, i.e., any point on the curve can be used as the base point.
Let n be the prime order of E(Fp) and Q = kPi, where k ∈ Fp, Pi ∈ E and
i ∈ [1, n− 1], then the group of points on E looks as follows:
E = {O, P1, P2, . . . , Pn−1}. (4.7)
The shortECC assumption is that the group of points on the elliptic curve is
cyclic and it has prime order. There are no subgroups of E and there are no
points (6= O) with an order different from n. Thus, any point from this group
can be a generator of E. So there are (n− 1) possible generators of E:
E = {O, P1, 2P1, . . . , (n− 1)P1} (4.8)
E = {O, P2, 2P2, . . . , (n− 1)P2} (4.9)
... (4.10)
E = {O, P(n−1), 2P(n−1), . . . , (n− 1)P(n−1)} (4.11)
(4.12)
Where < P1 >=< P2 >=< P3 >= · · · =< P(n−1) > and
∀i,j,k∈[1,n−1] iPj 6= iPk. (4.13)
It can be seen that the point Q can be obtained in each of the (n − 1) above
mentioned permutations:
∀i∈[1,n−1]∃k∈[1,n−1] kPi = Q. (4.14)
Additionally, to prevent from Pohlig-Hellman attack [4] it is necessary that the
order of the base point is the largest possible prime integer. The ideal solution
is to find a point which generates all the points on the curve E and has a prime
order, equal to the curve order. Lagrange’s theorem says [4] that the order of an
arbitrarily chosen group element P 6= O divides the order of the group. Thus,
when a curve has a prime order n, there are only two possible orders of points
on the curve: 1 and n, and since 1P = P 6= O, the only possible order of any
point P is n. The Hasse’s theorem [26] brings very useful information about the
interval for the possible curve order and in the above mentioned case it is also
the order of the base point. This theorem says that for an elliptic curve E over
a finite field Fp the order of E(Fp) satisfies
p+ 1− 2√p ≤ #E(Fp) ≤ p+ 1 + 2√p (4.15)
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The following procedure finds the curve order in this interval:
Let P = (x, y) be a randomly chosen point on E and let
Q = (p+ 1 + 2
√
p)P (4.16)
The next step is to find a second point R = zP , where z 6= (p + 1 + 2√p) and
R = Q. Since Q−R = O then
t = p+ 1 + 2
√
p− z (4.17)
is the potential order of the point P .
The random Rho Pollard method computing collisions of elements of a finite
group [4] can be used to find z. The collision is found after approximately
√
ppi/2
iterations. If the collision occurs, the last thing to check is if t is prime and if it
belongs to the Hasse range. If this is the case, then the base point and its order
are found, else the procedure needs to be repeated for new curve parameters (a
and b), value p and the prime field can also be changed. For primality testing
of small integers (< 341550071728321) a deterministic variant of Miller-Rabin
Primality Test can be used [22].
4.1.12 Selecting the sub-components for shortECC
The shortECC is designed to be used in resource contained environments. The
short parameters’ lengths should cause less computational effort than standard
ECC. Thus, also the selection of the sub-components used in shortECC should
be done carefully. The sub-components are the mechanisms responsible for the
following functionalities:
 generation of the cryptographic secure pseudo-random numbers used for
instance as secret keys or as parameters in encryption operation;
 hash function used in digital signature algorithms;
 algorithm used for embedding the plain text message into a point on the
elliptic curve.
The selection of the mechanisms for shortECC cryptosystem and the motivation
behind that are explained in the following paragraphs.
Pseudo-random number generators
The requirements of the shortECC dictate provision of the cryptographic pseudo-
random numbers of lengths that are suitable for computations in shortECC, i.e.
lengths not exceeding the lengths of shortECC parameters. The state of the art
cryptographic pseudo-random number generators [19] or [18] operate on numbers
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that are significantly larger than shortECC parameters and often do not fulfil
the requirements for cryptographic randomness. For the needs of shortECC a
new approach called lmRNG [54] was proposed and it is described in Chapter
5. It is computationally inexpensive and consuming minimal energy, compared
to the state of the art solutions and in contrast to these it does not involve any
hardware besides the one already available on the test platform. Additionally,
it produces cryptographic secure pseudo-random numbers, what was tested (see
Section 5.3.3).
Hash functions
Standard digital signature schemes [26] use cryptographic hash functions that
produce outputs of 160 or even 512 bits, thus they are not applicable in the
shortECC authentication protocol. Even the lightweight proposals offer outputs
that are too long for the shortECC approach, e.g. the H-Present hash functions
offering outputs between 64 and 128 bits [48]. Additional drawback of the state
of the art hash functions is that they involve block ciphers or other ciphering
methods for generating the hash messages, and thus, require effort related to
the implementation of additional algorithms and extra memory space on the test
platform. The shortECC proposes an authentication scheme, but without using
any hash function. This scheme is described further in Section 4.2.2.
Embedding the plain-text message into point
In order to encrypt the message using the elliptic curve cryptography, it is neces-
sary to embed the message into a point lying on the elliptic curve. For the prime
fields chosen for the shortECC cryptosystem, i.e., those with the property:
p ≡ 3 (mod 4) (4.18)
where, p is the order of the prime field, the method for embedding the message
into a point is as follows [25]: Let m be some plain text message such that:
0 ≤ m ≤ p/1000− 1 (4.19)
The three least significant digits (decimal) are append to m until there is an x,
where
1000m ≤ x ≤ 1000(m+ 1) ≤ p (4.20)
such that
f(x) = x3 + ax+ b (4.21)
is a square in Fp. Then P = (x, f(x)(p+1)/4) is the point on the elliptic curve
E(Fp) that represents the message m. And the message m can be decoded from
the point P by dropping the three least significant digits (decimal) from the
x-coordinate.
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4.2 Protocols in shortECC
The shortECC approach provides two possibilities for securing the data: encryp-
tion (and decryption) and the digital signature/authenticated encryption. The
methods are described in following two sections.
4.2.1 Encryption and Decryption
In shortECC the encryption and decryption operations are performed using the
Elliptic Curves ElGamal algorithm (see Algorithm 8). The algorithms are suit-
able also for standard ECC and since they do not involve any additional sub-
components, e.g. hash function, they can be used in the unchanged form also
in shortECC. The algorithm used for encryption requires secure pseudo-random
number generation, what in case of shortECC is ensured by the lmRNG genera-
tor (see Chapter 5). The appropriate generation of the pseudo-random numbers
is crucial to the overall security of the ElGamal encryption [57].
4.2.2 Digital Signature/Authenticated Encryption with message re-
covery
The standard ECDSA protocol for digital signature requires using a crypto-
graphic hash function, see Algorithm 9. As mentioned previously, due to the
large input and output numbers, such functions are inapplicable in the shortECC
environment. Thus, a modified version of standard Elliptic Curves Digital Sig-
nature Algorithm is proposed within the framework of this thesis, for the digital
signature. It is suitable for both shortECC and the standard ECC cryptography
and its security is discussed later in this section. The signature algorithm is a
1-to-1 signature without appendix, but with message recovery. The message is
signed with the signer’s private key and encrypted with the verifier’s public key.
The signing phase results in an integer - the signature and two points - the en-
crypted message. The signature is computed using the signer’s private key, two
coordinates of the point representing the message and a pseudo-random integer.
This pseudo-random integer is also used for encryption of the message. In the
verification phase, the verifier uses its private key to decrypt the message and the
signer’s public key to verify the signature. The verification is possible only in case
when the decryption of the message is correct, since its coordinates are needed
in order to verify the signature. The advantage of this method, compared to
symmetric solutions, like Message Authentication Code and Encryption, is that
there is no need to have the common keys for each pair of the group members.
The authenticity of the message sent by the sender can be verified by all the
nodes in the trusted group knowing the sender’s public key.
The signing procedure is presented in Algorithm 11, while the verification
procedure is presented in Algorithm 12.
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Algorithm 11 shortECC Digital Signature with message recovery - signing
Summary: There is a set of shortECC parameters, base point P on the elliptic
curve, private key kS of the signer, public key QV of the verifier, message m.
Result: The signature (R,S, s).
The signer performs the following steps:
Converts the message m into a point M = (xM , yM ) on the shortECC elliptic
curve.
Generates a pseudo-random integer k ∈ (0, p− 1).
Computes s = k−1(xM + yMkS) (mod p).
Encrypts message point M using the same pseudo-random k and the public
key QV of the verifier:
R = kP
S = M + kQV
The signature is a triple (R,S, s).
Algorithm 12 shortECC Digital Signature with message recovery - verification
Summary: There is a set of shortECC parameters, base point P on the elliptic
curve, private key kQ of the verifier, public key Qs of the signer, signature
(R,S, s).
Result: Acceptance or rejection of the signature, the message m.
The verifier performs the following steps:
Decrypts R and S to obtain the coordinates (xM , yM ) of M needed in the next
steps of verification:
M = S − kQR.
Computes two values u1, u2:
u1 = s
−1xM , u2 = s−1yM .
Verifies the signature by comparing R with:
u1P + u2QS
If the comparison is true then return ACCEPT SIGNATURE and convert M
into m; else return REJECT SIGNATURE.
The correctness of the verification procedure of the signature (R,S, s) can be
proved in following way:
u1P + u2QS = s
−1xMP + s−1yMQS (4.22)
= k(xM + yMkS)
−1xMP+ (4.23)
+ k(xM + yMkS)
−1yMkSP (4.24)
= k[(xM + yMkS)
−1(xM + yMkS)]P (4.25)
= kP = R (4.26)
Security of the proposed digital signature
The proposed approach is applicable also in the standard ECC environment under
the assumption that the ECDLP problem is hard to solve. The signature consists
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of three elements: two points and an integer. Trying to get any information, i.e.
private key of the verifier, from these two points is possible only if the ECDLP
can be solved. The third element contains the private key of the signer and in
order to prevent this private key from being disclosed following assumptions need
to be taken into consideration:
 The random element k needs to be changed for each new signature, other-
wise the private key is unsafe and can be revealed, (see Note 4.35 in [21]).
 The coordinates of the message are also a part of the integer element of
the signature and knowing them it would be easier to discover the private
key of the signer. Thus, the message has to be sent to the verifier in the
encrypted form and only the verifier is able to decrypt it first and then
to verify the signature. Access to these coordinates is possible either after
decrypting the message from the two points available in the signature or
after solving the ECDLP.
In case of shortECC the security of the proposed protocol is guaranteed by keeping
the shortECC parameters secret.
4.2.3 shortECC key pair generation
At the start-up each node in the trusted group is equipped with its private/public
key pair and is able to confirm its identity to the access authority by presenting the
ticket granted by the trusted third party. The cryptosystem based on shortECC
uses a cryptographic secure pseudo-random number generator, which can be used
by the members of the trusted group to generate the private keys. Public keys are
generated by multiplying the currently used base point by the generated private
keys. These are then distributed among the sensor nodes in the group using a
parameter management tool, e.g. using the standard ECC.
4.3 Security Analysis
The following section considers the attempts of an adversary to break the short-
ECC cryptosystem. Compared to the standard ECC the task of an attacker is
slightly different, i.e. it is not sufficient to just obtain the secret key, but she also
has to find the right elliptic curve parameters.
The computations and estimations were performed for 32-bit long shortECC
parameters. The first scenario concerns finding the shortECC parameters on
the basis of the eavesdropped x-coordinate of some unknown point. The second
scenario considers the ambiguity of the results even if the shortECC parameters
are known.
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4.3.1 Determining the shortECC parameters on the basis of the known
x-coordinate
Let us assume that an adversary has an eavesdropped x-coordinate, which is
32-bit long. In order to determine the proper shortECC parameters she has to
separate the set of elliptic curves on which a point with this x-coordinate exists
and to do this she needs all the elliptic curves over all 32-bit long prime fields.
In the first step it is necessary to find all the 32-bit long prime numbers, i.e.
all orders q of primes field Fq, which fulfil the condition that (q mod 4 = 3).
According to [38] the number of prime numbers less than z can be approximated
as follows:
z
ln z
. (4.27)
In order to estimate the number of 32-bit long prime numbers it is necessary to
determine the smallest and the largest 32-bit primes serving as boundaries of the
range containing all the 32-bit long primes. The two numbers were generated
using simple Java application and verified on the web site [10]. The range deter-
mined by the smallest and largest 32-bit prime is taken as a search area and only
the finite fields lying in this range will be considered as 32-bit long (prime) fields
in the next computations. The smallest 32-bit prime is
2 147 483 659 (4.28)
and the largest 32-bit prime is
4 294 967 291. (4.29)
Then, the number of 32-bit long primes can be approximated as follows:
4 294 967 291
ln 4 294 967 291
− 2 147 483 659
ln 2 147 483 659
= 193 635 250−99 940 775 = 93 694 475 (4.30)
Since all prime numbers are odd numbers, computing (q mod 4) gives as a
result either 1 or 3. Thus, the number of primes that are relevant for shortECC
approach is assumed to be about:
93 694 475
2
= 46 847 236 (4.31)
The number of possible elliptic curves over one prime finite field Fq equals to
q2 − q [30]. Hence, the number of elliptic curves over the prime field which order
is the smallest 32-bit prime is equal to:
2 147 483 6592 − 2 147 483 659 = 4 611 686 063 524 544 622 (4.32)
And, the number of elliptic curves over the prime field which order is the greatest
32-bit prime is equal to:
4 294 967 2912 − 4 294 967 291 = 18 446 744 035 054 845 972 (4.33)
4.3. SECURITY ANALYSIS 55
Thus, the average number of elliptic curves over an arbitrary finite field which
order is 32-bit prime can be estimated as follows:
4 611 686 063 524 544 622 + 18 446 744 035 054 845 972
2
= 11 529 215 049 289 695 297
(4.34)
Hence, for all 32-bit prime fields relevant for shortECC there are approximately
11 529 215 049 289 695 297 ∗ 46 847 236 = 540 111 858 308 825 987 946 649 092
(4.35)
potential elliptic curves.
The shortECC assumption is that the group of points on the elliptic curve
has a prime order. In order to determine if the elliptic curve has prime order it is
necessary to count the points on the curve and check the primality of the number
of points. Generating and checking the primality of one such an elliptic curve
takes about 6 seconds on a computer with Intel Core2 Duo P9600 processor and
4Gbytes of RAM.
The number of the elliptic curves of prime order can be estimated as follows:
According to the Hasse’s Theorem [21] it is possible to compute the interval
(called Hasse interval) to which the order of the elliptic curve belongs. For the
elliptic curve E over prime field Fq the order of the elliptic curve is in the interval:
(q + 1− 2√q, q + 1 + 2√q). (4.36)
For the above mentioned smallest 32-bit long prime number, i.e. for the q =
2 147 483 659 the Hasse interval is:
(2 147 390 978, 2 147 576 341). (4.37)
Thus, there are 185 363 possible orders of the elliptic curve in this interval, and
the number of possible prime orders in this interval can be estimated as follows:
2 147 576 341
ln 2 147 576 341
− 2 147 390 978
ln 2 147 390 978
= 8225. (4.38)
For the above mentioned greatest 32-bit long prime number, i.e. for the q =
4 294 967 292 the Hasse interval is:
(4 294 836 221, 4 295 098 365). (4.39)
Thus, there are 262144 possible orders of the elliptic curve in this interval, and
the number of possible prime orders in this interval can be estimated as follows:
4 295 098 365
ln 4 295 098 365
− 4 294 836 221
ln 4 294 836 221
= 11 286. (4.40)
The average number of possible orders for the arbitrary 32-bit field Fq can be
estimated as follows:
185 363 + 262 144
2
= 223 754. (4.41)
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Thus for all 32-bit prime fields there are approximately:
93 694 475 ∗ 223 754 = 20 964 513 559 150 (4.42)
possible orders of the elliptic curves.
Hence, the number of elliptic curves per order can be estimated as follows:
Assuming an equal distribution of the elliptic curves over the possible orders there
are approximately:
540 111 858 308 825 987 946 649 092
20 964 513 559 150
= 25 763 147 653 531 (4.43)
elliptic curves of an 32-bit order per finite prime field.
The average number of possible prime orders for the arbitrary field Fq can be
estimated as follows:
8225 + 11 286
2
= 9756. (4.44)
Thus, the number of elliptic curves of an 32-bit prime order over 32-bit prime
fields is as follows:
9756 ∗ 2 576 314 765 353 = 25 134 526 850 783 868. (4.45)
In order to select the elliptic curves on which a point with x-coordinate ex-
ists, the adversary has to solve approximately 25 134 526 850 783 868 elliptic curve
equations. Finding one square root modulo, i.e., solving the elliptic curve equa-
tion takes about 100 microseconds on a computer with Intel Core2 Duo P9600
processor and 4Gbytes of RAM. For all the curves it would take about 79 646 509
years. This task can easily be split in almost any number of parallel tasks,
but even assuming an ideal parallelization overhead and having 80 000 000 above
mentioned processors available, it would take about a year to solve it.
4.3.2 Ambiguity of the results for known shortECC parameters
Let xQ be the eavesdropped x-coordinate of some unknown point. Let us assume
that the adversary has a set of elliptic curves, each of them having the point
with xQ coordinate. Let E(Fq) be one of the curves from the set and Q ∈ E be
the point with xQ coordinate. The xQ coordinate belongs to a point which is a
multiple of the base point P chosen for the cryptosystem, i.e. Q = (xQ, yQ) = kP ,
where the integer k is unknown. If the adversary is able to determine the base
point on some elliptic curve, then it is possible to break the security system. As
mentioned in Section 4.1.11, the points on elliptic curves chosen for shortECC
cryptosystem are always cyclic groups of prime order. If the order of E(Fq) is a
prime number n, then there are n − 1 possible cyclic groups of n points on this
elliptic curve, where each cyclic group is created by a different point on E. Thus,
every cyclic group consists of all points on the elliptic curve and in every cyclic
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group the point with xQ coordinate can be found. But, in every cyclic group the
point with xQ coordinate is created by multiplying a different base point by a
different integer. The following formulas present the cyclic groups of points on
E each having different base point, i.e. P1, P2, P3, . . . , P(n−1) respectively.
E = {O, P1, 2P1 = (xQ, yQ), . . . , (n− 1)P1} (4.46)
E = {O, P2, 2P2, . . . , 123P2 = (xQ, yQ), . . . , (n− 1)P2} (4.47)
E = {O, P3, 2P3, . . . , 44P3 = (xQ, yQ), . . . , (n− 1)P3} (4.48)
... (4.49)
E = {O, P(n−1), 2P(n−1), . . . , (n− 1)P(n−1) = (xQ, yQ)} (4.50)
It can be seen that in each cyclic group the point with xQ coordinate is created
from a different base point. Thus, if the adversary has a suspected elliptic curve
with a point having xQ as a coordinate, the probability of finding the proper base
point is equal to
1
n− 1 (4.51)
4.3.3 Attack on shortECC: finding the modulus and equation param-
eters on the basis of points in an uncompressed form
Let E(Fp) be the shortECC elliptic curve represented by equation
Y 2 = X3 + aX + b. (4.52)
Let S = (xS , yS), T = (xT , yT ), R = (xR, yR) be the eavesdropped points and
both the coordinates of these points are known. In order to determine the p, a, b
parameters an adversary forms the following equations:
y2S = x
3
S + axS + b (mod p)
y2T = x
3
T + axT + b (mod p)
y2R = x
3
R + axR + b (mod p)
(4.53)
And after that, she computes:
y2S − y2T = x3S + axS + b− (x3T + axT + b) (mod p)
y2T − y2R = x3T + axT + b− (x3R + axR + b) (mod p)
y2S − y2R = x3S + axS + b− (x3R + axR + b) (mod p)
(4.54)
What after reducing gives:
y2S − y2T − x3S + x3T = a(xS − xT ) (mod p)
y2T − y2R − x3T + x3R = a(xT − xR) (mod p)
y2S − y2R − x3S + x3R = a(xS − xR) (mod p)
(4.55)
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Since xS , yS , xT , yT , xR, yR are all known, the equations reduce to:
n = ak (mod p)
n′ = ak′ (mod p)
n′′ = ak′′ (mod p)
(4.56)
with unkown a, p parameters. What leads to:
nak′ = akn′ (mod p)
n′ak′′ = ak′n′′ (mod p)
n′′ak = nak′′ (mod p)
(4.57)
And finally to: 
nk′ − kn′ = 0 (mod p)
n′k′′ − k′n′′ = 0 (mod p)
n′′k − nk′′ = 0 (mod p)
(4.58)
The last thing to compute is the greatest common prime divisor of the three
above left-hand values. The number can be considered as the probable prime
modulus p.
The following example illustrates the above considerations. Let E(F7) be the
secret shortECC elliptic curve represented by the equation
Y 2 = X3 + 2X + 4 (mod 7) (4.59)
Let us assume that an adversary has four eavesdropped points S = (2, 3), T =
(3, 4), R = (6, 1), U = (3, 3) and has no information about the parameters (a, b, p).
Then for the three points S = (2, 3), T = (3, 4), R = (6, 1) she can compute:
32 = 23 + 2a+ b (mod p)
42 = 33 + 3a+ b (mod p)
12 = 63 + 6a+ b (mod p)
(4.60)
And after that, she computes:
32 − 42 − 23 + 33 = a(2− 3) (mod p)
42 − 12 − 33 + 63 = a(3− 6) (mod p)
32 − 12 − 23 + 63 = a(2− 6) (mod p)
(4.61)
The equations boil down to:
12 = a(−1) (mod p)
204 = a(−3) (mod p)
216 = a(−4) (mod p)
(4.62)
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What leads to: 
12a(−3) = 204a(−1) (mod p)
12a(−4) = 216a(−1) (mod p)
204a(−4) = 216a(−3) (mod p)
(4.63)
And finally to: 
168 = 0 (mod p)
168 = 0 (mod p)
−168 = 0 (mod p)
(4.64)
And for the three points S = (2, 3), T = (3, 3), R = (6, 1) she can compute:
32 = 23 + 2a+ b (mod p)
32 = 33 + 3a+ b (mod p)
12 = 63 + 6a+ b (mod p)
(4.65)
What gives: 
19 = a(−1) (mod p)
197 = a(−3) (mod p)
216 = a(−4) (mod p)
(4.66)
What leads to: 
19a(−3) = 197a(−1) (mod p)
19a(−4) = 216a(−1) (mod p)
197a(−4) = 216a(−3) (mod p)
(4.67)
And finally to: 
140 = 0 (mod p)
140 = 0 (mod p)
−140 = 0 (mod p)
(4.68)
Taking the results from above computations one can compute the greatest
common prime divisor for 140 and 168:
140 = 2 ∗ 2 ∗ 5 ∗ 7 (4.69)
And
168 = 2 ∗ 2 ∗ 2 ∗ 3 ∗ 7 (4.70)
The number determined and suspected to be the prime field order is 7 what is
actually the order of the prime field in this example.
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4.3.4 Attack on shortECC: finding the modulus and equation param-
eters on the basis of points in compressed form
Let E(Fp) be the shortECC elliptic curve represented by equation
Y 2 = X3 + aX + b. (4.71)
Let x1, x2, . . . , xn be the eavesdropped x-coordinates of the points on the ellip-
tic curve. In order to determine the y-coordinates y21, y
2
2, . . . , y
2
n and the p, a, b
parameters an adversary needs to solve the following system of equations:
y21 = x
3
1 + ax1 + b (mod p)
y22 = x
3
2 + ax2 + b (mod p)
...
y2n = x
3
n + axn + b (mod p)
(4.72)
The above system of equations can be reduced to the system of linear equations
by substituting y21, y
2
2, . . . , y
2
n in the following way:
y21 = z1, y
2
2 = z2, . . . , y
2
n = zn. (4.73)
Hence, the system to be solved looks as follows:
z1 = x
3
1 + ax1 + b (mod p)
z2 = x
3
2 + ax2 + b (mod p)
...
zn = x
3
n + axn + b (mod p)
(4.74)
Sorting the unknowns and knowns gives the following system:
−x31 = ax1 + b− z1 + 0z2 + · · ·+ 0zn (mod p)
−x32 = ax2 + b+ 0z1 − z2 + · · ·+ 0zn (mod p)
...
−x3n = axn + b+ 0z1 + 0z2 + · · · − zn (mod p)
(4.75)
which can be further written as a vector equation:
−x31
−x32
...
−x3n
 = a

x1
x2
...
xn
+ b

1
1
...
1
+ z1

−1
0
...
0
+ z2

0
−1
...
0
+ · · ·+ zn

0
0
...
−1
 (4.76)
The vector equation is equivalent to a matrix equation in the form:
Mu = w (4.77)
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where
M =

x1 1 −1 0 . . . 0
x2 1 0 −1 . . . 0
...
...
...
...
. . .
...
xn 1 0 0 . . . −1
 , u =

a
b
z1
z2
...
zn

, w =

−x31
−x32
...
−x3n
 (4.78)
Matrix M is called the coefficient matrix and the matrix Mw of the following
form:
Mw =

x1 1 −1 0 . . . 0 −x31
x2 1 0 −1 . . . 0 −x32
...
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
xn 1 0 0 . . . −1 −x3n
 (4.79)
is named augmented matrix.
On the basis of the above matrices it is possible to determine the number
of solutions of the given system of equations. It is done using the ranks of
the matrices and their properties which are described in the Rouche-Cappelli
theorem, where rank of the matrix is the maximal number of linearly independent
(there are no vectors in this matrix which can be written as an combination of
the other vectors from this matrix) vectors building the columns (or rows) of the
matrix. Thus, the rank of the matrix is always less than or equal to the number
of columns and less than or equal to the number of rows in the matrix. The
Rouche-Cappelli theorem says that:
Theorem 3. There is solution of the system of the linear equations if the rank of
the coefficient matrix M is equal to the rank of the augmented matrix Mw. Addi-
tionally, if the rank of the M and Mw is equal to the number of unknowns (given
in matrix u), then there is only one unique solution of the system. Otherwise,
the system of equation is undetermined.
Since the number of columns in the matrix M is greater than its number of
rows, the rank of the matrix M is dictated by the number of its rows and it can
be at most n. Similarly, the rank of the augmented matrix Mw is dictated by the
number of its rows and it can also be at most n. Taking these maximal values
one can see that:
rank(M) = rank(Mwb) = n ≤ n+ 2 (4.80)
where n + 2 is the number of unknowns it this system. Thus, the system unde-
termined and it is impossible to find the shortECC parameters only having the
x-coordinates.
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The following example illustrates the above considerations. Let E(F7) be the
secret shortECC elliptic curve represented by the equation
Y 2 = X3 + 2X + 4 (mod 7) (4.81)
Let S = (2, 3), T = (3, 4), R = (6, 1), U = (3, 3) be points on this elliptic curve.
Let us assume that an adversary has eavesdropped the x-coordinates of these
four points resulting in the following knowledge S = (2, yS), T = (3, yT ), R =
(6, yR), U = (3, yU ) and no information about the parameters (a, b, p) and also
about the y-coordinates of the four points. Hence, the system of equations has
the following form: 
y21 = 2
3 + 2a+ b (mod p)
y22 = 3
3 + 3a+ b (mod p)
y23 = 6
3 + 6a+ b (mod p)
y24 = 3
3 + 3a+ b (mod p)
(4.82)
The above system of equations is reduced to a system of linear equations by
substituting the y-coordinates in the following way:
y21 = z1, y
2
2 = z2, y
2
3 = z3, y
2
4 = z4. (4.83)
After sorting the unknowns and knowns the system to be solved has the following
form: 
−23 = 2a+ b− z1 (mod p)
−33 = 3a+ b− z2 (mod p)
−63 = 6a+ b− z3 (mod p)
−33 = 3a+ b− z4 (mod p)
(4.84)
What results in the following matrix representation:
M =

2 1 −1 0 0 0
3 1 0 −1 0 0
6 1 0 0 −1 0
3 1 0 0 0 −1
 , u =

a
b
z1
z2
z3
z4

, w =

−23
−33
−63
−33
 (4.85)
The augmented matrix Mw has the following form:
Mw =

2 1 −1 0 0 0 −23
3 1 0 −1 0 0 −33
6 1 0 0 −1 0 −63
3 1 0 0 0 −1 −33
 (4.86)
4.4. EVALUATION 63
Even without computing the exact values of the ranks of the matrices M and
Mw and assuming the maximal possible ranks, one can see that:
rank(M) = rank(Mw) = 4 ≤ 6, (4.87)
where 6 is the number of the unknowns in this system. Thus, the system is
undetermined what means that on the basis of the eavesdropped x-coordinates
it is impossible to find the other unknown parameters.
4.4 Evaluation
This section provides the evaluation of the shortECC, which is compared to
different state of the art approaches. The evaluation considers the lifetime, the
computational efforts as well as applicability of shortECC.
4.4.1 Elliptic curves versus finite field arithmetic: brute force search-
ing area
The asymmetric key cryptography protocols whose security is based on the hard-
ness of solving DLP or of factorization of large integers, e.g. RSA or ElGamal
operate on finite fields and thus the area for searching the security parameters
is only the finite field Fp = (0, ..., p − 1). Under the similar circumstances as
those assumed for shortECC, i.e. the public parameters are shifted to the private
domain of some trusted group, finding these parameters requires determining the
suspected orders of the finite fields and after that solving the underlying prob-
lem. Thus, reducing the key lengths for these cryptographic protocols causes
the exhaustive search attack to be easier as in the case of the security protocols
based on reduced elliptic curves parameters. As mentioned in Section 4.3.1, the
brute force attack on the shortECC with unknown parameters requires deter-
mining the suspected finite fields in the first place and after that for each finite
field the appropriate elliptic curves need to be chosen from all the existing ones
on the respective finite field. Thus, the search area for the shortECC is similar
to a tree, where one parameter value identified as suspected one (for instance
the finite field order) generates a large number of branches (elliptic curves) and
each of these branches has also large number of own branches (equiprobable base
points). Thus, public key cryptography with reduced key lengths has more sense
for protocols based on elliptic curves.
4.4.2 shortECC versus DES: lifetime
In shortECC all parameters, like the elliptic curve equation, the base point and
its order are known only to the trusted group members. Performing an attack
to reveal these secret shortECC parameters can be based on the eavesdropped
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Table 4.1: Clock cycles measured on MSP430F5438A as costs of prime fields and
elliptic curve operations
Finite field
Operation 32-bit 128-bit 160-bit 192-bit
Addition in Fp 272 1091 1272 1433
Multiplication in Fp 306 649 172 1 060 458 1 545 824
Inversion in Fp 4704 1 016 254 1 557 159 2 168 614
Point Addition 12 000 3 215 203 4 697 290 6 378 132
Point Multiplication 409 120 651 662 120 1 259 460 903 2 078 311 103
ElGamal Encryption 920 240 1 309 111 615 2 527 176 991 4 168 103 741
ElGamal Decryption 424 320 658 092 719 1 268 854 497 2 091 047 263
x-coordinates. To check the number of elliptic curves on which a point with the
eavesdropped x-coordinate exists, an adversary has to solve 25 134 526 850 783 868
elliptic curve equations, what on the PC with Intel Core2 Duo P9600 processor
and 4Gbytes of RAM would take about79 646 509 years, (see Section 4.3.1). In
[29] the authors present the lifetime of the Digital Encryption Standard (DES)
when using key lengths between 56-bit and 78-bits. The estimations were per-
formed using a Pentium II 450MHz PC that is computationally less efficient than
the one used for the tests of shortECC. The lifetime of the 56-bit key is equal to
1110 years, and for the 78-bit key the lifetime is 3 220 000 000 years. It is clear
that these key lifetimes for the DES keys would be even shorter, if the used PC
would be more performant. Thus, shortECC provides higher security level than
DES for comparable key lengths.
4.4.3 shortECC versus standard ECC: computational efforts
In case of shortECC the computational effort needed on the wireless sensor node
is reduced, compared to the effort related to the computations needed by the
standard ECC. Sensor nodes are usually equipped with 8- or 16-bit microcon-
trollers, performing computations on words of the length corresponding to their
architecture, so the smaller the prime field the less operations need to be per-
formed. The test measurements presented in this section where performed on a
MSP430F5438A microcontroller [55] working with a 1MHz clock frequency. The
computational costs for the elliptic curves over 128, 160 and 192-bit prime fields
Fp recommended by NIST and the elliptic curve over 32-bit prime field are pre-
sented in Table 4.1. The Table 4.1 presents the comparison of the clock cycles
needed by the MSP430F5438A microcontroller for the basic prime field opera-
tions and the elliptic curve operations for the above mentioned curves. Both
shortECC and standard ECC use the same C code. The presented results show
4.4. EVALUATION 65
Table 4.2: Comparison of shortECC and ECIES
shortECC ECIES
Secret Parame-
ters Management
standard ECC standard ECC
Message lengths max 32-bits arbitrary
Encryption shortECC ElGamal standard ECC, AES, hash
Decryption shortECC ElGamal standard ECC, AES
that the shorECC is significantly faster, compared to the standard ECC and re-
quires about one second for encryption and half of a second for decryption. The
most important operation in the cryptographic algorithms - point multiplication
- is about 1500 times faster for 32-bit shortECC, than for 128-bit standard elliptic
curves. Thus, if it is foreseen to secure the group/broadcast communication in a
WSN scenario, it may be reasonable to use shortECC in cases when the packets
to be secured do not exceed 32 bits.
4.4.4 shortECC versus Elliptic Curves Integrated Encryption Scheme:
application scenarios
Since the standard ECC is commonly used for sharing credentials in secret key
protocols, e.g. Elliptic Curves Diffie-Helmann (see Algorithm 4), one could try to
use the ECC functionalities and algorithms in order to secure the exchanged data.
For this purpose the Elliptic Curves Integrated Encryption Scheme (ECIES) can
be used (see Algorithm3.2.3). It provides mechanisms for encryption and de-
cryption of data, but besides the ECC algorithms it requires implementation of
symmetric encryption functions, e.g. AES and of hash functions. The scheme
uses standard ECC in order to be able to work with 128-bit (or larger) outputs
of AES and hashing functions. Table 4.2 presents a short comparison of the EC
Integrated Encryption Scheme and shortECC implementation. In the considered
scenario both shortECC and ECIES use standard ECC for the management of
the secret parameters. Taking into consideration the previous comparison of the
computational efforts of shortECC and standard ECC it is clear, that in cases
when the bit-length of the data to be secured does not exceed 32 it is more en-
ergy saving to use shortECC for the encryption/decryption purposes. In this case
implementation of the additional security functionalities is not required, because
shortECC and standard ECC can use the same algorithms.
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Table 4.3: Comparison of shortECC and AES
Security Approach shortECC Symmetric Key
Algorithm ECC ElGamal AES
Secret Synchronization no needed needed
Unique components no needed unique nonce needed
Knowledge about payload length no needed needed
Public Key Length (uncompressed) 64 bits -
Private Key Length 32 bits 128 bits
Private Key Length 32 bits 128 bits
Results for encryption and decryption of 32-bit payload
Clock Cycles for encryption 920240 19000
Clock Cycles for decryption 423120 22000
Plaintext Length 32 bits 32 bits
Ciphertext Length (compressed) 66 bits 32 bits
4.4.5 shortECC versus AES: encryption and decryption
Shifting the usually public ECC parameters into the private domain makes the
shortECC approach comparable to secret key cryptography approaches, like the
AES algorithm, which is often used in WSN applications. In contrast to AES
the shortECC does not require any additional parameters, like knowledge about
the length of the payload or unique nonces. Also the secret synchronization
required in AES is not needed in the shortECC approach. Table 4.3 presents the
results of comparing the encryption and decryption mechanisms using shortECC
and AES. The numbers of clock cycles presented in the table were computed as
average values of 1000 encryptions and decryptions performed for each of the
methods. The computations were performed on a sensor node equipped with the
MSP430F5438A microcontroller.
The performed comparison shows (see Table 4.3) that even the reduced lengths
of the parameters in shortECC are not sufficient to make the ECC based cryptog-
raphy competitive to AES, with respect to the computational effort. The cost of
one shortECC encryption can be compared to 48 AES encryptions and the cost
of one shortECC decryption is comparable to 19 AES decryptions. However, this
does not disqualify the shortECC approach from being useful. Depending on the
application an analysis of needs and costs has to be ,made and in some cases
shortECC can have more advantages than AES.
An example case when the application of the shortECC could be interesting
is the following one. In the scenario it is assumed that both shortECC and AES
could be used in the trusted group environment and that the data to be secured
is broadcast in the network. After receiving by the nodes it is decrypted in order
to be further processed. The number of nodes in the network is larger than
50. The encryption using shortECC uses private/public key pair of the node
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issuing the data and only the nodes having its public key are able to decrypt
the data correctly. In case of AES all nodes have to have one and the same key
for encryption and decryption purposes if the data is to be broadcast within the
group.
The mote-class attack within the framework of the trusted group, which tries
to compute the secret key of the node sending the encrypted data, requires solv-
ing the ECDLP on the sensor node (assuming that the malicious node has the
valid shortECC parameters). Solving the ECDLP allows the malicious node to
impersonate the one being actual issuer of the data. The tests performed have
shown that solving ECDLP on the sensor node equipped with MSP430F5438A
microcontroller needs about 24 hours. In case of AES, all nodes are able to im-
personate the one sending the data right away. Willing to avoid this situation
requires to use different secret keys for each pair of nodes in the trusted group.
What causes 50 encryptions is the example network, making the total cost larger
compared to one shortECC encryption.
4.4.6 shortECC versus asymmetric digital signatures: length of the
security parameters
In [47], the authors show that the standard public key cryptography security
approaches are computationally very expensive for the wireless sensor nodes.
The shortECC proposes modification of the ECDSA algorithm not using any
hash function in the computations, what reduces the length of the data, which is
processed by the authenticating algorithm. The asymmetric approaches proposed
in [20] and in [59] are based on the discrete logarithm problem in some finite field
and require hash functions in the computations. Thus, using these protocols with
reduced key lengths causes on the one hand that the brute force attack can be
performed easier than in the case of shortECC and on the other hand the hash
functions are not appropriate if the intention of the protocol is to operate on short
numbers, e.g. 32-bit long ones. The asymmetric approach proposed in [7] does
not require a hash function and is originally working on large integers. Reducing
the security parameters causes also in this case that the brute force attack can
be performed easier than in the case of shortECC.
4.4.7 shortECC versus AES-GCM: confidentiality, integrity and au-
thenticity
Table 4.4 presents the results of comparison of authenticated encryption methods
using shortECC and AES-GCM. The numbers of clock cycles presented in the
table were computed as the average values of 1000 encryptions and decryptions
performed for each of the methods. The computations were performed on the
sensor node equipped with the MSP430F5438A microcontroller. Also in this case
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Table 4.4: Comparison of shortECC and AES-GCM
Security Approach shortECC AEC-GCM
Secret Synchronization no needed needed
Unique components no needed unique nonce needed
Knowledge about payload length no needed needed
Public Key Length (uncompressed) 64 bits -
Private Key Length 32 bits 128 bits
Payload Length 32 bits 32 bits
Clock Cycles for authenticated encryption 925000 36000
Clock Cycles for verification and decryption 424320 34000
Plaintext Length 32 bits 32 bits
Authenticated Ciphertext Length 98 bits 160 bits
Table 4.5: Comparison of existing security protocols
WSN protocol Confidentiality Authentication Using shortECC reasonable?
LSec [52] symmetric asymmetric no
TinySec [24] CBC MAC no
SPINS [46] symmetric MAC no
LEAP++ [32] 96-bit ECC MAC yes
Eschenauer [17] none asymmetric no
Ning [41] none hash-based no
Chae [31] none 512-bit RSA yes
the reduction of the lengths of the keys in shortECC is not sufficient to make
the ECC based cryptography competitive to AES based authentication schemes,
with respect to the computational effort. Only the length of the authenticated
ciphertext is shorter in case of shortECC.
4.4.8 shortECC in state of the art WSN security protocols: applica-
bility
This section discuses the possibilities of the application of shortECC in existing
security solutions for wireless sensor networks. Table 4.5 provides a selection
of state of the art protocols and the possibilities of substituting already used
security means by shortECC.
The LSec approach proposed in [52] is used in clusters/groups. The group
communication in clusters is secured by the private keys exchanged periodically
by asymmetric means. The shortECC requires standard asymmetric means for
exchange of security parameters and thus, is itself inappropriate for key exchange.
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The TinySec approach proposed in [24] provides authenticated encryption
and authentication, but uses symmetric cryptography for these purposes. Since
shortECC is computationally more expensive as symmetric approaches, it cannot
replace CBC and MAC used in SPINS.
In case of the SPINS approach [46] symmetric cryptography and MAC are
used to provide confidentiality and data authentication. Application of shortECC
would increase the computational efforts needed for these two operation.
The approach LEAP++ presented in [32] proposes using short key elliptic
curve cryptography for exchanging the public keys in the encrypted form. The
ECC-128 or ECC-96 can be used as lightweight cryptosystem for key exchange.
Since the public keys need to be exchanged securely and should be unknown
outside some group/cluster, this scenario fulfils the requirements of shortECC.
A digital signature algorithm is used in the approach proposed in [17]. It is
used for the key distribution purposes what in case of shortECC requires standard
ECC. Thus, shortECC authentication cannot be used in this approach.
The Message specific puzzle described in [41] provides weak authentication
based on hash function. Since the computational effort needed by hash function
is negligible in comparison to shortECC, the method proposed in this thesis is
inappropriate for these weak authentication purposes.
In the method proposed in [31] the broadcast authentication is performed
using the asymmetric RSA/Rabin signature with message recovery, with security
based on hardness of factorization of large integers. In this approach the RSA
security parameters are changed periodically in order to make the system secure,
because factorization of 512-bit RSA moduli can be performed within few hours.
This thesis shows that short key elliptic curve systems applied under specified
conditions are secure for a longer period of time compared to the 512-bit RSA.
Thus, substitution of RSA/Rabin signature by the one proposed in shortECC is
possible, because shortECC is also designed to secure broadcast communication
within the trusted group. Additionally, replacing the 512.bit RSA with 32-bit
shortECC makes the approach feasible for WSN, where the still relatively large
data blocks (512 bit) would cause high transmission costs.

Chapter 5
lmRNG: Pseudo-random Number
Generator
This chapter presents the means for generating pseudo-random numbers that on
one hand are suitable for cryptographic purposes and, on the other hand, are ap-
plicable in the resource constrained world of WSN [54]. The proposed generator
was developed as a part of the shortECC approach, that requires pseudo-random
numbers in the encryption and the digital signature protocols. Nevertheless, it
can be used as an independent tool and its applicability is not restricted to the
Wireless Sensor Networks only. The following section describes the concept and
the overall idea of this approach and is followed by the sections introducing the
detailed description of the two parts the generator consists of: the first one re-
sponsible for obtaining the seed - an initial value for the subsequent computations,
and the second one, which is a deterministic algorithm outputting the pseudo-
random numbers. The chapter includes the evaluation of the randomness and
of the cryptographic applicability of the lmRNG using the NIST testing mecha-
nisms and concludes with the comparative evaluation of the proposed approach
and other solutions used in WSN environments.
5.1 Overview
Random number generators (RNG) can be classified as follows:
 True random number generators (TRNGs). This type of generators uses
a non-deterministic source (entropy source) and some processing function
(entropy derivation process) to produce random numbers. As an entropy
source a device or some process generating unpredictable outputs can be
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taken, e.g., digital signals from oscillators, mouse movements or noises in
an electrical circuit.
 Deterministic random number generators (DRNGs). A DRNG produces
pseudo-random numbers using some algorithm requiring one or more ran-
domly selected input values - the seed. Since the outputs of the DRNG are
generated by deterministic functions based on the seed it is very important
that the seed is random and unpredictable. Thus, the seeds for DRNG
should be generated using TRNG [43].
Following the guidelines by NIST the DNRG algorithm developed within the
framework of this thesis consists of two blocks, the first one responsible for gener-
ating the seed, and the second one responsible for generating the pseudo-random
numbers using the seed as its initial value. The algorithm was implemented and
tested on wireless sensor nodes. The test platform was the IHPNode [23] which
is equipped with the MSP4305438A microcontroller [55] with a built in ADC
converter. The ADC converter changes the analog signals (continuously chang-
ing quantities) into digital data and the noise of this device was used to produce
seeds.
5.2 Generation of the Seed
According to NIST, a DRNG requires an initial value-seed that is determined by
an entropy source [1]. The seed used as the DRNG initial value has to contain
sufficient entropy to assure that the outputs of the DRNG will be unpredictable.
Entropy is defined as follows [2]:
Definition 14. The entropy of a discrete random variable X is the expected
amount of information that will be provided by an observation of X. In case
when the information content is measured in bits and the expected information
content of X is m bits, we say that the random variable X has m bits of entropy.
The entropy H(X) of discrete random variable X = {x1, ..., xn} is computed as
follows:
H(X) = −
n∑
i=1
p(xi) log2 p(xi), (5.1)
where p(xi) is the probability of xi. The value of the variable X can be
predicted prior to its observation. The larger the entropy of the variable X, the
larger the uncertainty of predicting the value of X. The entropy can be measured
using diverse formulas. One of them is called min-entropy. It is used as a worst-
case measure of the uncertainty of predicting the value of X. The min-entropy
m of the variable X means that the probability of observing any particular value
of X is less or equal to 2−m.
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5.2.1 The Proposed Seed Generator
According to the NIST recommendation [43], a non-deterministic source for gen-
erating the seeds should be used for a pseudo-random number generator. In this
work the ADC module available on the test sensor node platform is used for that
purpose. The exact source is the noise of the ADC module. In the test setup
the ADC module is fed with the on-chip temperature sensor and this integrated
hardware combination is used to generate the seed. The seed is generated by tak-
ing the least significant bit of each measurement, because it is the most sensitive
bit, i.e., even small noise or oscillation of the temperature influences its value.
These bits are concatenated in order to generate the seed of the required length.
5.2.2 Entropy Source Evaluation using NIST Test Suite
The special publication by NIST [2] describes the requirements for entropy sources
and also the tests that shall be used for validation of these sources. The vali-
dation of the entropy sources is based on the correctness of the estimation of
the min-entropy. The tests implemented in Python programming language are
available from NIST upon request and were used within the framework of this
work to evaluate the proposed source of the seed value. The following steps were
performed in order to test the entropy source:
1. Generation of the input data for the test suite, i.e., a dataset of 1 000 000
1-bit samples, which are unprocessed.
2. Test if the input data is Independent and Identically Distributed (IID), i.e.
if it is a sequence of random variables where each element of the sequence
has the same probability distribution and the other values and all values are
mutually independent, [2]. The claim that the input data is IID is required
for full entropy sources, working in laboratory environment and being under
constant control. Within the framework of this thesis a non-IID entropy
source is considered.
3. Perform five tests for non-IID data sets to obtain the estimate of the min-
entropy.
 The Collision Test: measures the mean time to the first collision in a
dataset. The goal of the collision statistic is to estimate the probability
of the most-likely state, based on the collision times, [2].
 The Partial Collection Test: computes the entropy of a dataset based
on how many distinct values in the output space are observed; it yields
low entropy estimates for output streams that contain a small number
of distinct output values, and yields high entropy estimates for output
streams that diversify quickly, [2].
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 The Markov Test: measures the dependencies between consecutive out-
puts from the noise source, [2].
 The Compression Test: computes the entropy rate of a dataset, based
on how much the dataset can be compressed, [2].
 The Frequency Test: computes entropy based on the occurrence of the
most-likely sample value, [2].
4. After estimation of the entropy, the data set is subjected to the sanity
checks: tests that discover major failures in the design and gross overesti-
mates of the entropy by the test suite. Failure to pass these tests means that
the entropy source fails testing, [2].
Evaluation Results
The NIST tests or non-IID entropy sources were used to evaluate 1000 sequences
each 1000000 bit long (Figure 5.1). The min-entropy values determined for each
sequence were between 0.83 and 0.92, thus the 0.83 value was taken as the min-
entropy for the ADC with the temperature sensor as the entropy source.
5.3 Deterministic Pseudo-Random Number Generator
The deterministic algorithm generating the pseudo-random numbers for cryp-
tographic purposes should assure that its outputs are unpredictable under the
assumption that the seed is always kept secret. The outputs generated by the
deterministic algorithms are in a form of binary sequences. It should be impos-
sible to predict the next outputs in the generated sequence on the basis of any
previously generated and known number. Also the backward discovery of the
numbers in the sequence should be infeasible. The proposed approach was devel-
oped based on the properties and behaviour of the chaotic functions, which are
briefly introduced in the following subsection.
5.3.1 Dynamical Systems and Mathematical Chaos
Mathematical chaos is a property of non-linear difference equations showing a
large sensitivity of the solutions of these equations to small changes in their
parameters. The features of the mathematical chaos can be used to produce non-
deterministic algorithms for generation of pseudo-random numbers. A dynamical
system is a set of coupled difference equations which determine how the state of
the system evolves over time [27]. A non-linear difference equation, where the
time is integer-valued is a map of the following form:
Xt+1 = F (Xt). (5.2)
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For some parameters the dynamical system can exhibit chaotic behaviour. Such a
system is sensitive to initial conditions, i.e., small changes of the input parameter
cause significant differences in the future values.
Logistic Map
Logistic Map is a chaotic map representing a population model and it was intro-
duced in [36]. It is a recurrence relation of degree two, mathematically written
as:
xn+1 = rxn(1− xn) (5.3)
where the real number r is a control parameter and the initial element x0 needs to
be defined prior to the computations. The elements x0, x1x2, ... are real numbers
lying in the interval (0, 1). The Logistic Map is sensitive to the parameter r,
which has to be chosen carefully. There are some values of r resulting in non-
chaotic behaviour of the Logistic Map, e.g., according to [27] for r values below
3.57 the chaotic map is in periodic regime.
5.3.2 The Proposed Pseudo-Random Number Generator
Due to its simplicity and chaotic behaviour, the Logistic Map is a perfect candi-
date for a function generating random bits [35], [28]. The main disadvantage of
the Logistic Map is that it operates on real numbers, what makes it computation-
ally expensive and not suited for resource constrained devices. Computations on
integers are performed faster than those performed on real numbers. Table 5.1
presents the clock frequency independent results of the measured time needed by
the microcontroller for computing the iterations of the Logistic Map using dif-
ferent data types, i.e., the float numbers as it is used in the original form of the
Logistic Map and for integers as proposed in the modification within this thesis.
It also shows that even without the support of the hardware multiplier available
on the test platform, the computations on the integers need only the half of the
clock cycles, compared to those performed on floats. The hardware multiplier
(HM) allows for six times faster integer computations compared to floats. And
the presented numbers of clock cycles required for integer multiplication can be
optimized further, since the multiplication result is divided modulo 232 and thus
only a partial 32-bit multiplication is needed.
Additionally, on most microcontrollers, and on the used microcontroller as
well, the representation of floating point numbers has limited precision. On the
test platform it is restricted to 7 digit precision, what can cause periodicity and
lead to loss of chaotic behaviour of the Logistic Map. Thus, instead of the floating
point operations, in the lmRNG approach a modified Logistic Map with integers
is used and it is given by the following equation:
xn+1 = (xn(1 + xn) mod 2
32) + 1 (5.4)
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Table 5.1: Clock cycles needed for Logistic Map iterations performed on
MSP430F5438A
Data Type 1 Iteration 32 Iterations
float 522 16165
uint32 282 8485
uint32+HM 83 2117
And since the computations are performed on the integers greater than 0, the
following special case has to be considered:
if (xn(1 + xn) mod 2
32) + 1 = 0 then xn+1 = 1. (5.5)
In order to reduce the number of multiplications in a single iteration, and thus to
make the approach less computationally expensive, the parameter r used in the
original Logistic Map is in the proposed modification, equal to 1. The modulo
operation is required in order to ensure that the outputs of the algorithm will be in
range 0, ..., 232 what is required by the shortECC approach. Independently from
the operations used in the modified formula, performing the modulo operation at
the end of computations of the single iteration and incrementing it by one causes
that the result is always greater than 0. Thus, the originally used subtraction
operation was changed by addition.
The here proposed pseudo-random number generator uses two so modified
Logistic Maps that require two different seeds as inputs.
xn+1 = xn(1 + xn) mod 2
32 + 1 (5.6)
yn+1 = yn(1 + yn) mod 2
32 + 1 (5.7)
In order to generate a n-bit long number z, n iterations of both maps are per-
formed. In each iteration the outputs of both maps are compared and on the
basis of this comparison the i-th bit of the number z is generated as follows:
if (xi > yi) then zi = 1, otherwise zi = 0. (5.8)
The performed experiments have shown that using only a single modified Logistic
Map to reduce computations and generating the bit streams by taking from the
iteration results different combinations of bits, caused the generated bit sequences
to have poor quality and, as a result, to fail the NIST tests for randomness
sources. Additionally, the final method for determining the value of the i-th
bit was proposed after a number of experiments. The combination of two maps
with the decision based on the result of the comparison of their outputs causes
the approach to have the desired properties, i.e., the output is random. Further,
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using two maps, each using a 32-bit seed as input increases the number of possible
PRNG sequences. This reduces the chance of a brute force attack to recover the
seeds on the basis of the generated numbers.
5.3.3 Randomness Evaluation using NIST Test Suite
The special publication of NIST [43] provides 15 statistical tests that shall be
applied to a binary sequence to perform the evaluation and comparison of it
to a truly random sequence. The tests examine the sequence looking for some
defined sub-sequences or patterns whose presence means that the sequence is non-
random. In this thesis the NIST testing suite was used to test the randomness of
the binary sequences produced by the proposed deterministic solution. For the
randomness assessment of the proposed approach 1000 binary sequences, each
1000000-bit long, were generated.
The NIST testing suite provides a set of statistical tests assessing the ran-
domness of an evaluated sequence. The sequence consists of zeros and ones that
represent the binary form of the numbers. The aim of a statistical test is to assess
the probability that the null hypothesis (H0) is fulfilled, where H0 means that
the sequence is random. Each test is focused on checking a different property
of the sequence in order to test the H0 and either accepts or rejects it. For this
purpose in each test the randomness statistic is used. The randomness statis-
tic has a distribution of possible values, and mathematical methods determine
the reference distribution for it. The reference distribution allows computing a
critical value, which determines the boundary between those samples resulting
in a randomness statistic that leads to rejecting the H0 and those that lead to
accepting the H0. For a given sequence the test statistic value is computed and
if it is bigger than the critical value, the H0 is rejected. On the basis of the test
statistic the Pvalues is computed. The method for computing the Pvalues is chosen
for each test independently and a special function is used for this purpose. It can
be for example the error function or the gamma function. It is the probability,
that a perfect random number generator would have produced a sequence less
random than the sequence that was tested. If the Pvalues = 1 then the sequence
appears to be random. For the NIST test suite the Pvalues has to be larger than
0.01 to accept the null hypothesis. The number α = 0.01 is called the significance
level.
The following tests are part of the NIST Testing Suite:
 Frequency (Monobit) Test: checks if the proportion of zeros and ones in the
sequence is about the same and compares it to the values expected from
the truly random sequence. The next tests depend on passing this test.
 Frequency Test within a Block: checks if the proportion of ones in the M-bit
block is about M/2, what is expected from truly random sequence.
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 Runs Test: determines the number of runs in the sequence, where a run is a
subsequence consisting of identical bits and bounded with bits of opposite
value. The number of runs having various lengths is compared with values
expected from truly random sequence.
 Test for the Longest Run of Ones in a Block: checks if the length of the
longest run of ones in the sequence is compared to the length of the runs
of ones in the truly random sequence.
 Binary Matrix Rank Test: checks for linear dependence among fixed length
sub-strings of the original sequence, [43].
 Discrete Fourier Transform (Spectral) Test: detects the periodicities (peaks),
e.g. repetition of patterns that are near to each other.
 Non-overlapping Template Matching Test: detects if the sequence contains
too many given non-periodic m-bit patterns. For the detection the m-bit
window corresponding to the non-periodic pattern is used. The window
slides bit by bit as long as the pattern is found and after that the window
is reset to the bit after the pattern and the search resumes.
 Overlapping Template Matching Test: determines the number of occur-
rences of the given pattern. This test also uses m-bit window to find the
pattern and the widow slides bit by bit as long as the pattern is found.
After that the window slides one bit and the search resumes.
 Maurer’s Universal Statistical Test: computes the number of bits between
the same patterns, where the number is the measure related to the length
of the sequence after compression. The test detects if the sequence can be
compressed without loss of information, what implies the sequence to be
non-random.
 Linear Complexity Test: measures the length if a linear feedback shift reg-
ister. When the computed value is too short it implies non-randomness of
the sequence.
 Serial Test: checks the frequency of all possible m-bit patterns in the se-
quence. If the probability that a given m-bit sequence is comparable with
the probabilities of other m-bit patterns, the sequence appears to be ran-
dom.
 Approximate Entropy Test: compares the frequency of overlapping blocks of
two consecutive/adjacent lengths (m and m+1) against the expected result
for a random sequence, [43].
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 Cumulative Sums (Cusum) Test: computes the cumulative sum of adjusted
digits in the sequence, using (−1,+1). This value is then compared to
the one expected from the random sequence. The cumulative sum may be
considered as a random walk. For a random sequence, the excursions of the
random walk should be near zero, [43]
 Random Excursion Test: computes the number of cycles with K visits in
cumulative sum random walk. A cycle of a random walk consists of a
sequence of steps of unit length taken at random that begin at and return to
the origin. The purpose of this test is to determine if the number of visits
to a particular state within a cycle deviates from what one would expect for
a random sequence, [43]
 Random Excursion Variant Test: detect deviations from the expected num-
ber of visits to various states in the random walk, [43]
After the binary sequences have been tested, there are two approaches for
interpreting the empirical test results. In the first approach the proportion of
the sequences that passed the test, i.e. having Pvalues > 0.01 is computed. The
proportion is computed on the basis of the number of sequences to be tested and
the sequences that passed the test. Let 1000 be the first number, and 998 the
second one. Then the proportion is equal to 0.998 and the range of acceptable
proportions is computed using the formula:
(1− α)± 3
√
(1− α)α
m
(5.9)
wherem is the sample size and α is the significance level. Thus, for 1000 sequences
the proportion should be larger than 0.9805607. In the second approach the
distribution of the Pvalues is determined in order to check the uniformity. For
that the PUvalues of all the Pvalues is computed. The PUvalues is computed using
the special function as defined in the NIST suite. If PUvalues ≤ 0.0001, then the
Pvalues can be considered to be uniformly distributed.
Evaluation Results
Table 5.2 and Table 5.3 present the results of NIST tests performed on the ran-
dom bit streams generated by the proposed pseudo-random number generator.
For the 1000 tested sequences, the proportion of passed tests should be larger
than 0.9805607. All the tests were passed, what means that proposed approach
generates pseudo-random numbers.
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Table 5.2: Results of Non-Parametrized Tests.
Statistical Test
Distribution
of Pvalues
Proportion
of passed
tests
Frequency (Monobit) Test 0.500279 0.9910
Cumulative Sums Test
forward sums 0.668321 0.9920
reverse sums 0.340858 0.9920
Runs Test 0.299736 0.9880
Test for the Longest Run of Ones in a Block 0.914025 0.9850
The Binary Matrix Rank Test 0.834308 0.9950
The Discrete Fourier Transform (Spectral) Test 0.254411 0.9890
Random Excursions Test
x = -4 0.137669 0.9869
x = -3 0.287113 0.9869
x = -2 0.306059 0.9918
x = -1 0.613238 0.9918
x = 1 0.770642 0.9886
x = 2 0.825651 0.9902
x = 3 0.901436 0.9837
x = 4 0.256024 0.9806
Random Excursions Variant Test
x = -9 0.856548 0.9935
x = -8 0.899148 0.9951
x = -5 0.487035 0.9918
x = -2 0.552416 0.9821
x = 2 0.506324 0.9886
x = 5 0.275709 0.9951
x = 7 0.041549 0.9886
x = 9 0.773817 0.9886
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Table 5.3: Results of Parametrized Tests.
Statistical Test
Distribution
of P-
Values
Proportion
of passed
tests
Linear Complexity Test (block length 500) 0.452173 0.9910
Serial Test (block length 16) 0.208837 0.9870
Serial Test (block length 14) 0.647530 0.9850
Non-Overlapping Template Matching Test
template = 000110111 0.435430 0.9920
template = 001001101 0.191687 0.9940
template = 001011011 0.595549 0.9910
template = 101111100 0.755819 0.9850
template = 110111000 0.395940 0.9920
template = 111010100 0.325206 0.9930
template = 111101100 0.204439 0.9900
Overlapping Template Matching Test 0.672470 0.9900
Maurer’s Universal Statistical Test 0.508172 0.9870
Frequency Test Within a Block (block size 104) 0.666245 0.9870
Approximate Entropy Test (block length 10 bits) 0.429923 0.9870
5.4 Evaluation of the Proposed Approach
Table 5.4 presents the comparison of the proposed approach with the currently
used solutions for generating random numbers on low power devices. The table
is divided into three parts: first one (PRNG) specifies the method producing the
outputs considered as random numbers, the second one (Seed) names the entropy
source serving as the input for the PRNG methods and the third one defines if
there is a necessity of cooperation between sensor nodes in order to generate
random numbers.
 The PRNG part contains the information about the algorithms used for
generating the random numbers, about using the additional hardware sup-
porting the algorithms and about the results of the tests performed in order
to check if the outputs of the PRNG methods can be considered as pseudo-
random numbers.
– Algorithm Used - There are various algorithms used to generate the
final outputs in the compared methods. Three methods [18], [33] and
[19] use MAC based functions, two others [58] and [51] use operations
on bits, e.g. XOR. The approach presented in this thesis uses chaos
based Logistic Map as the deterministic source of randomness.
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– Hardware Involved - The PRNG parts require the hardware modules
in following cases: in [18] the radio is used to generate the input values
for the CBC-MAC, in [58] the telegraphic signals from single electron
transistor are taken as inputs for the bit skipping or bit counting op-
erations, in [51] the timer values are XORed with seed which in turn
is constantly updated using the check sums of radio packets.
– NIST Randomness Tests - Three methods were tested using the NIST
Test Suite [43] for pseudo-random numbers. For the algorithm pro-
posed in this thesis 1000 sequences each containing 1 000 000 bits were
generated and tested. All the sequences passed the tests. Another
approach tested using the NIST Test Suite is the one presented in
[58]. There is no information about the number of sequences that
were tested and the presented results show that not all the tests were
passed, e.g. the Runs Test. The third algorithm tested is the one
presented in [19]. The authors performed the tests for 100 sequences
and all the tests were passed. The remaining three methods were not
tested using the NIST Test Suite.
 The Seed part contains the characteristics of the seeds used as input val-
ues for the above described PRNG methods. There is information about
the source of the input values, about the entropy of the input values and
about the results of the tests performed in order to check if the values have
enough entropy to be considered as inputs for PRNG used for cryptographic
purposes.
– Seed Source - The proposed approach uses the least significant bits
of the values from the ADC temperature sensor in order to produce
seeds. Also in case of the solution presented in [33], the ADC values
are used as seed for the generation algorithm. During the research on
the approach presented in this thesis, the raw values generated by the
ADC were tested using the NIST tests for entropy sources and the tests
were failed. The method presented in [18] requires that the initial value
is given at the programming time and stored in the internal EEPROM.
While running the generating algorithm, the seed is changed and the
new value is saved in the memory. According to the authors this
operation is infrequent. The initial values for the approach presented
in [58] are obtained using the single electron capture/emission process.
The algorithm used in [51] uses sensor node ID as the input value, what
causes that, in case of reboot for example, the initial value is always
the same. The last method in comparison, presented in [19] uses the
sensor measurements as the seed sources.
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– Hardware Involved - Only the approach from [51] does not require
hardware as entropy source. The remaining methods use on-board
entropy sources: the approach presented in this work and [33] use
ADC. The approach presented in [19] uses sensor measurements re-
ceived from the neighbouring sensor nodes. The method proposed in
[18] requires radio, because the reseeding operation is done using data
from packets received by radio. The initial values in [58] require the
single electron transistor existing on the sensor board.
– Seed entropy - Only two approaches give detailed information about
the measured entropy of the seed produced by the used entropy sources.
Both cases consider the one bit samples and for such a case the full
entropy value is equal to 1, what, following Definition ??, gives 50%
chance to guess the value of the next bit sample. The seed source cho-
sen for the generator presented in this thesis has an entropy equal to
0.83, what gives 56% chance to guess the value of the one bit sample.
The entropy was measured using the NIST tests for entropy sources
[2]. The second method providing the information about entropy is
the one presented in [19]. The results given 0.57, 0.66 and 0.71 are
worse than the result of the proposed approach, because the probabil-
ities of guessing the bit values in one bit samples are 67%, 63% and
58%, respectively.
– NIST Entropy Source Tests - The only method tested using the NIST
entropy source tests is the one proposed in this work. The rest of
the approaches do not provide any information about checking if the
entropy sources they use are good enough to be used in cryptographic
pseudo-random number generators.
 The Single Node Generator part - The approach presented in this thesis
and the one presented in [58] do not require any cooperation between sen-
sor nodes in order to generate the pseudo-random numbers. The three
remaining methods need that the nodes communicate in order to produce
the pseudo-random numbers, thus the radio communication is directly in-
volved in their generation processes.
lmRNG versus tinyRNG
Table 5.5 presents the comparison of the proposed approach with TinyRNG with
respect to the time needed for different steps of the algorithm. The lmRNG gen-
erator does not need any initialization, what in case of TinyRNG takes about 147
milliseconds. In case of TinyRNG the generation of seeds is preceded by a number
of entropy accumulations, each taking about 2 milliseconds. The generation of
TinyRNG seed itself takes about twice the time needed by the proposed lmRNG
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Table 5.5: Comparison with HM vs TinyRNG @ 8MHz
Operation lmRNG TinyRNG
Initialization 0 146 ms
Seed Generation 530 µs 1.13 ms
Entropy Accumulation 0 2.16 ms
Generation of 64 bits 1 ms 440 µs
generator. And the generation of 64 random bits takes about 1 millisecond by
the here proposed generator, compared to about 440 microseconds in TinyRNG.
Altogether, the whole process of generating the 64 random bits takes less time in
case of the here proposed approach, even if the initialization phase is not taken
into account. Additionally, the main advantage of the proposed approach is that
it allows for generation of random numbers also in case when the radio transceiver
is turned off, e.g., the sensor node is in power saving mode. This is impossible in
case of TinyRNG. Keeping the radio to be turned off as often as possible is one
of the main requirements for the wireless sensor networks.
Chapter 6
Conclusions
This chapter concludes the thesis. It provides a short summary of the results of
the main investigation - analysis of the applicability of elliptic curve cryptography
with short parameters. But it also presents the contributions of the thesis and
sketches (possible and planned) future developments based on its results.
6.1 Summary
This thesis investigated the applicability of short key asymmetric cryptography
in low power Wireless Sensor Networks. The decision about choosing the ECC
as the base for the proposed approach and the investigation was caused by the
fact that elliptic curve cryptography provides the same security level as public
key cryptography based on the modular arithmetic, while using much shorter
lengths of the keys [3]. In order to start the further investigation and to propose
the approach for ECC with reduced key lengths, it was necessary to recognize
the constraints of WSN influencing the effectiveness of computations when per-
forming the cryptographic algorithms. Another factor that influenced the target
key lengths was the size of the data that is usually processed in the WSN ap-
plications. After considering the above mentioned issues it was decided to focus
on 32-bit keys for the ECC based cryptosystem using these key lengths, named
shortECC. Under standard conditions for the ECC applications, such key lengths
are considered to be insecure [3]. Thus, an application scenario, together with
its constraints and requirements, was defined for the new approach. The main
restriction here was that the shortECC approach can be only used in a closed
group of nodes and that all the shortECC parameters are shared only with the
members of this group.
Within the closed group of nodes, it was intended to use the shortECC cryp-
tosystem for provision of confidentiality and authentication. The ElGamal ECC
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encryption and ECDSA were chosen as the base algorithms ensuring these two
security requirements. Further, it was important to choose elliptic curves of a
specified order. It was shown that due to the immunity to the Pohlig-Helmann
attack and simultaneously due to the provision of ambiguity of correct results,
while performing the brute force attack, the elliptic curves of prime order are
good candidates to be used in shortECC.
The next step in the investigation was the selection of sub-components re-
quired by the cryptographic algorithms, like a hash function or a pseudo-random
number generator. It was shown that the state of the art solutions either do not
operate on such short numbers as these needed by shortECC, or are too expen-
sive (or complex) to be applicable. Hence, in order to omit the necessity of using
hash functions a modified version of ECDSA was proposed within the framework
of this thesis. The provision of the necessary cryptographic pseudo-random num-
bers for shortECC is ensured by the novel algorithm presented and evaluated in
this thesis - lmRNG [54].
6.2 Contributions
Considering the constraints and the requirements of the shortECC approach
it was apparent that the state of the art ECC as well as the pseudo-random
number generators are computationally too expensive to be used in short key
cryptographic algorithms. Thus, new methods and approaches providing above
mentioned functionalities were proposed.
Lightweight Security Approach
For the ECC the new approach involves modifications of the cryptosystem defini-
tion and algorithms. As already mentioned, shortECC changes the distribution
of parameters between the secret and public domain. Besides this change, most
of the standard ECC algorithms can be applied.
The motivation for providing the modified authentication scheme was that the
state of the art approaches use hash functions that produce outputs that are not
applicable in the shortECC approach. Further, even if a hash function generating
output with the needed size would be available, its application here would be
pointless due to high probability of collisions. Thus, an algorithm that does not
require a hash function was necessary. The proposed algorithm is a modified
version of the standard Elliptic Curves Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA). It
is a 1-to-1 digital signature algorithm without appendix with message recovery.
The security of the proposed protocol is guaranteed under the condition of keeping
the shortECC parameters secret.
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Cryptographic Pseudo-random Number Generator
The motivation for the research on a new approach for generating cryptograph-
ically secure pseudo-random numbers was the fact that the sub-components of
shortECC need to be computationally inexpensive and minimal energy consum-
ing and none of the state of the art solutions fulfils these requirements. The
proposed novel cryptographic pseudo-random number generator uses the prop-
erties of mathematical chaos for the provision of unpredictable pseudo-random
numbers. The algorithm is based on the logistic map - a chaotic function - which
was modified in order to be applicable in WSN. Instead of real numbers it oper-
ates on integers, since integer arithmetic is more natural for sensor nodes. The
generator is able to generate random numbers of an arbitrary length, from single
or several bits to thousands or even millions of bits. The outputs produced by
the new algorithm were tested according to the NIST recommendations for de-
terministic pseudo-random algorithms and entropy sources. All the test defined
by NIST were passed, what indicates that the proposed pseudo-random number
generator can be used for cryptographic purposes.
6.3 Results of the Applicability Investigation
To summarize the applicability analysis the following statement can be defined.
The evaluation of the security of shortECC has indicated that the approach is
secure only if the shortECC parameters are shared by members of a closed and
trusted group of nodes and only if the points on the shortECC elliptic curves,
being results of the algorithms, are exchanged in the compressed form.
The shortECC approach was compared to symmetric and asymmetric state
of the art solutions. It was shown that it works slower than the symmetric
AES encryption, but is significantly faster than the standard ECC algorithms,
especially when the bit-length of the data to be secured does not exceed 32.
The shortECC approach could be used to substitute the Elliptic Curves In-
tegrated Encryption Scheme (ECIES), which provides the encryption and de-
cryption of data, but besides the ECC algorithms, it also requires symmetric
encryption and hash function. The ECIES scheme operates on standard 128-bit
ECC what allows computations on the 128-bit (or larger) outputs of the AES
and of the hashing functions.
Within the framework of this thesis it was also shown that the shortECC
cryptosystem can replace cryptographic solutions in the state of the art cryp-
tographic protocols. For instance, in LEAP++ presented in [32] it is possible
to use the short key elliptic curve cryptography after fulfilling the shortECC re-
quirements. Further, according to the requirements defined in the scenario for
the RSA/Rabin signature [31] it is feasible to substitute it by the one proposed
for shortECC.
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6.4 Future Work
This thesis was (partially) realized within the European research project SMAR-
TIE [11] and the proposed solutions are going to be applied in this project. But
besides that, the results of this thesis are also going to be used and further in-
vestigated in several other activities. Thus, the next steps on the research on
security for Wireless Sensor Networks based on the results of this thesis are as
follows.
In order to investigate the applicability of other strong security approaches
in low power environments, it will be researched if cryptography based on hy-
perelliptic curves (HECC) better suits the WSN applications. These curves can
provide the same level of security as standard elliptic curves, while using signif-
icantly shorter parameters, i.e. they operate on 50 - 80 bit long numbers [40].
This can help to achieve the goal of reducing the amount of the exchanged data.
The computational expensiveness of the algorithms operating on hyperelliptic
curves is comparable to the expensiveness of the standard ECC approaches [40].
It will be challenging to adjust the HECC algorithms to be less computationally
expensive and thus applicable for WSN.
Another further research based on the results from this thesis involves the
lmRNG. It will be investigated if the random numbers generated by the pro-
posed cryptographic pseudo-random number generator can be used as a key chain.
There are cryptographic algorithms that are lightweight, but cause a huge bur-
den for managing and synchronizing the credentials. One of these algorithms is
the CaMyTs approach [5] providing the symmetric homomorphic encryption that
allows to aggregate encrypted values. This approach will be used together with
the lmRNG as the key chain in the European project e-balance to process the
protect the private data of the energy grid users.
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